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HYÖNÄ 
 
What can readers’ eye movement tell us about written language processing? 
Jukka Hyönä 
University of Turku, Psychology 
 
In my talk I will review evidence on how eye fixation patterns registered during reading can be 
used to study online written language processing. Evidence comes from studies investigating 
word identification and sentence parsing in Finnish – a morphologically rich language. The 
reviewed studies focus on morphological complexity, morphological agreement, and verb 
transitivity. First, data are presented demonstrating that long compound words are identified 
via their constituents, while short compound words are processed holistically. A second set of 
studies shows that morphological agreement in modifier–head noun phrases facilitates their 
processing. The effect is delayed in nature, which (in combination with other evidence) 
suggests that facilitation operates at the level of syntactic integration. Third, verb transitivity 
has an immediate effect on processing of verbs, when either transitivity is morphologically 
marked or the verb is frequent. Finally, evidence is reviewed that demonstrates an effect of 
morphological complexity and density in the processing of complex verb constructions, but 
only when the complex and less complex constructions are equally frequent. This is not the 
case when the complex construction is more frequent, suggesting that structural frequency can 
override a morphological complexity effect. In sum, these data demonstrate the usefulness of 
the eye-tracking method in studying online written language comprehension. 
 
─────── 
 
MILLER  
 
Narrative Reverberations: Early Socialization in Taipei and Longwood 
Peggy J. Miller 
      University of Illinois 
 
Starting from a model of socialization that places discursive practices front and center, this 
paper offers insights into the nature of the socialization process as it unfolds in the early years 
of life.  The particular discursive practice in question is personal storytelling, an oral narrative 
genre in which narrators invoke a past experience from their own lives.  In this talk, I draw 
upon a comparative study of personal storytelling in Taipei, Taiwan and Chicago, USA. The 
study was ethnographic and longitudinal; young children and their families were observed at 
home, and naturally-occurring stories of the child’s past experiences were recorded. We found 
that personal storytelling, involving the child as protagonist, occurred at remarkably similar 
rates in both sites and continued apace at 2,6, 3,0, 3,6, and 4,0 years.  This similarity co-existed 
with cultural differences in interpretive frameworks, participant roles, and meaning-making 
trajectories. Over time the Taiwanese and European-American children engaged more actively 
in personal storytelling and developed divergent senses of problem, reflecting the distinct 
versions of narrative they practiced day by day. These findings open a window on how 
socialization operates on the ground: socialization is a highly dynamic process in which 
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redundancy and variation are conjoined, and children participate as active, flexible, affectively-
engaged meaning makers.  
 
─────── 
 
MÜLLER 
 
How gestures mean. The embodied and dynamic dimension of language – culture – mind. 
Cornelia Müller 
European University Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder, 
 
When people talk, interact, exchange their opinions no matter in which language or culture, 
they do this typically by using all their communicative resources at hand. This means, they 
use their voice, their hands, their heads, their gazes, and their postures in a highly 
orchestrated and interactively attuned manner. Gestures’ meaning is constructed at the 
interface of language – culture – mind. It is embodied and multimodal. 
In this presentation we will lay out a cognitive-linguistic and sequential-analytical 
approach that allows for a systematic reconstruction of “how gestures mean”. We will show 
that combining these methods provides the grounds for a systematic reconstruction of 
gestures’ meaning. The establishment of gestural meaning is considered a cognitive, 
interactive and affective process – a process in which bodily movements acquire meaning that 
is as much part and parcel of the semantics, pragmatics, the syntax of verbo-gestural units as 
of turn-construction, communicative activities and of narrative structures. In fact gestures 
always show a layering of different meaning dimensions. 
The cognitive-linguistic and sequential analytical approach proposed here has been 
developed in the context of a research project “Towards a grammar of gesture” (Togog.com). 
Togog proposes a strictly form-based, sequential-analytical & context of use approach to the 
analysis of gestures. It departs from the assumption that gestural forms and their variations 
are meaningful, that they are motivated. On the other hand gestural meaning construction is 
inherently temporally structured and the meaning of a given gesture is always also a function 
of the particular position of a gestural unit – in relation to other gestural units, with regard to 
the flow of speech, and with regard to the continuous process of interactive negotiation. 
Togog’s form based account addresses both the motivation of the gestural form AND their 
sequential position in the flow of conversational interaction. It therefore offers a method to 
systematically reconstruct the embodied and dynamic facets of multimodal communication. 
 
─────── 
 
SHORE 
 
Making Time for Family: Autobiographical Memory and Family Talk 
Bradd Shore 
Anthropology Department/MARIAL Center Emory University 
 
Studies of Autobiographical Memory have focused on individual memory.  But an important 
component of autobiographical memory are the collective memories co-constructued by 
families in conversation.  This talk presents and analyzes data collected from extended 
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recordings of American middle-class families in conversation.  These conversations illustrate 
the ongoing negotiation of memory schemas that become the collective property of families 
and will help shape many of the adult recollections that children will have of their childhoods. 
 
─────── 
 
ZAHAVI 
 
Empathy and Interpersonal Understanding 
Dan Zahavi (University of Copenhagen) 
 
When it comes to understanding the nature of social cognition, we have – according to the 
standard view – a choice between the simulation theory, the theory - theory or some hybrid 
between the two.  The aim of my talk is to argue that there are, in fact, other options available, 
and that one such option has been articulated by various thinkers belonging to the 
phenomenological tradition. More specifically, in my talk I will contrast Lipps’ account of 
empathy – an account that has recently undergone something of a revival in the hands of 
contemporary simulationists – with various accounts of empathy found in the 
phenomenological tradition. I will discuss the way Lipps was criticized by Scheler, Stein, and 
Husserl, and outline some of the core features of their, at times divergent, alternatives. I will 
then proceed by considering how their basic take on empathy and social cognition was taken 
up and modified by Schutz – a thinker whose contribution to an analysis of interpersonal 
understanding has been unjustly neglected in recent years. 
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ABELIN 
 
Sound symbolism in interjections across languages 
Åsa Abelin 
Department of philosophy, linguistics and theory of science, University of Gothenburg 
abelin@ling.gu.se 
 
The paper discusses the non-arbitrary relation between semantics and sound structure –
including prosody – of interjections in Swedish and 9 other languages. Abelin (1999) found 
that there is a certain cross-linguistic similarity in production and understanding of sound 
symbolic words. Sound symbolism has had a revived interest lately cf. e.g. MacWhinney 
(2005), Namy and Nygaard (2008), Nygaard et al (2009). Ohala’s (1994) frequency code has 
shown a common ground for phonology in e.g. size-sound symbolism and emotional prosody. 
A special case of sound symbolic words are interjections and a contrastive study of some 
expressive interjections, commands and greetings will be presented. The relation between 
expression and meaning in emotional interjections is mainly indexical; the expression is caused 
by a bodily or mental reaction. Commands and greetings are oriented towards the listener and 
have an evocative function. Commands to animals are special since the “listener” has only 
presumed auditory and cognitive abilities. The expressive interjections of Swedish are also 
discussed in relation to phonaesthemes. The interjections elicitated were grouped into the 
categories pejorative, positive, surprise, pain, freezing, thoughtfulness, exhaustion, sudden 
insight, sneeze, good taste, commands to animals, mild warning to children, be quiet and 
scaring somebody, which can be classified as pejorative, positive, surprise, other bodily or 
mental feeling, commands, greetings (Abelin, 1999). Typical for the expression of interjections 
are the special sounds or sound combinations that occur, e.g. click sounds and non-standard 
phonotactic combinations, CV-structure and reduplicated CV-structure, lengthening of vowels 
or consonants. Consonant frames with a shift of vowel also occur. Prosody is important and in 
the case of emotional interjections relate to emotional prosody in general (cf. e.g. 
Mozziconacci, 2002). Prosody is also interacting with the lexical content of the interjection (cf. 
Dietrich et al, 2006). Are there semantic and phonological similarities between the interjections 
of different languages? Expressive interjections, which mirror bodily and mental states, could 
be similar in different languages. Evocative interjections could be similar because of aspects 
such as audibility –for a certain type of listener. The Swedish primary interjections, according 
to Ideforss (1928) were translated into 9 languages with the help of informants. The languages 
are English, Finnish, Hungarian, Icelandic, Malagasi, Ososo, Polish, Slovenian and Spanish. 
The semantic and phonological similarities and differences of interjections in the 9 different 
languages are presented. There are many vowels and consonants which are similar in the 
languages studied for the categories 'pejorative', 'pain', 'sneeze', 'good taste', 'be quiet', 
'thoughtfulness' respectively. Most of the consonants are labial or dental. There are no 
consonants produced behind the hard palate, except for [h]. The vowels are few and mostly [i], 
[u], and [a]. There are also different degrees of conventionalization in the language, both 
depending on speakers and on the situation. Prosodic characteristics of the interjections are 
discussed. 
 
References: 
Abelin, Å. (1999) Studies in sound symbolism. Göteborg, Göteborg University Dissertations. 
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Dietrich, S., Szameitat, D., Ackermann, H., & Alter, K. (2006) How to disentangle lexical and 
prosodic information? Psychoacoustic studies on the processing of vocal interjections. 
Progress in Brain Research 156, 295–302. 
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MacWhinney, B. (2005) A unified model, in N. Ellis & P. R. Robinson (Eds.) Handbook of 
cognitive linguistics and second language acquisition. Lawrence Erlbaum Press. 
Mozziconacci, S. (2002) Prosody and emotions, Proceedings of Speech Prosody 2002, Aixen-
Provence, France 
Namy, L., L. & Nygaard, L., C. (2008) Perceptual motor constraints on sound-to-meaning 
correspondence in language, Behavioral and brain sciences 3, 528–529 
Nygaard, L., C., Cook, A., E., Namy, L., L., (2009) Sound to meaning correspondences 
facilitate word learning, Cognition 112, 1, 181–186 
Ohala, J. J., (1994) The frequency code underlies the sound-symbolic use of voice pitch, in L. 
Hinton, J. Nichols, J. J. Ohala (eds) Sound symbolism, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 325–347. 
 
─────── 
 
ABUGOV & RAVID  
 
'ayer', 'ayers' or 'ayalax'? 
Yiddish noun plurals in the Israeli Ultra-Orthodox community 
Netta Abugov and Dorit Ravid, 
Tel Aviv University, Israel 
abugovn@gmail.com 
 
Yiddish is a Germanic Jewish language that contains a large quantity of Hebrew words (Katz, 
1987). On the eve of World War II, Yiddish had about 15 million native speakers (Harshav, 
2006), most of whom were annihilated in the Holocaust (Weinreich, 1980). Nowadays, 
Yiddish is spoken as a native tongue only by the Ultra-Orthodox community. Israeli Ultra-
Orthodox Hasidic [henceforth: IUOH] Yiddish is fraught with variation. The Yiddish dialect 
spoken in the IUOH community differs markedly from Standard Yiddish, our major source of 
knowledge about Yiddish grammar (Kleine, 2003). Moreover, in addition to the constant 
Hebrew-Yiddish "internal bilingualism" interface (Weinreich, 1975), the UO community is 
impacted by Israeli Hebrew in an intensive languages-in-contact situation. 
 The current study investigates the nominal lexicon and the plural system of native Ultra-
Orthodox Hasidic adults. Our window on Yiddish variation and change is the system of noun 
plurals, a basic morphological category that emerges and develops early on in child language. 
Plural formation in Yiddish is especially interesting, since the system mostly consists of 
Germanic categories (Example 1), but also contains Hebrew-derived plural markers (2) (Laaha 
et al, 2006; Ravid & Schiff, 2009; Weinreich, 1977). To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first systematic study of variation and change of the plural system in a Yiddish dialect. This 
map of the core nominal lexicon of this Yiddish dialect served as the basis for the 
developmental study of plural learning by IUOH children. 
 We administered a confrontational naming task to 48 IUOH bilingual (Yiddish/Hebrew) 
men and women. Participants (interviewed orally and individually) were asked to name 95 
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singular nouns from pictures and provide their singular and plural forms. Analysis of adults' 
responses revealed great variation (example 3, 4) with standard Yiddish, Classical and Modern 
Hebrew, as well as English sources. It also indicated an ongoing process of language change 
showing how profoundly the IUOH Yiddish nominal lexicon interfaces with Israeli Hebrew. 
Regarding plural forms, we found that the zero plural is now almost extinct in adults (example 
5), whereas umlaut plurals (6) are relatively stable; the -s and –n plural markers are now in 
competition (7), a new composite plural marker –ers has emerged (8), and modern Hebrew 
nouns predominantly take Hebrew plural markers (9). These results will be discussed in view 
of models of language variation and change (Slobin, 1977), and in the sociolinguistic context 
of the IUOH Yiddish-speaking community. 
 
Examples 
Text: (1) e.g., kind / kind-er 'child / child-ren'; (2) e.g., xaver / xavéyr-im 'friend / s – 
cf. Hebrew xaver / xaver-ím. 
Nominal lexicon: (3) e.g., SY: maranc 'orange' IUOHY: maranc (SY)/tapuz (Hebrew)/orange 
(English). (4) e.g., SY: pomidor 'tomato' IUOHY: tomate (loshn koydesh)/ agvaniya (Hebrew)/ 
tomato (English) 
Plural forms: (5) fish / fish-n 'fish / Pl' for Standard fish, Pl; (6) barg / berg 'mountain / s'; (7) 
keying / keying-s/-n 'king / s'; (8) tishtexers for Standard tishtexer 'table cloths'; (9) maxshev / 
maxshev-im 'computer / -s'. 
 
─────── 
 
BARNES  
 
The Functional Role of Metacognition in Simulational Mindreading 
Allison Barnes 
Departments of Philosophy and Psychology, University of Victoria, Canada 
abarnes@uvic.ca 
 
Humans possess a finely tuned capacity for representing the mental states of other people. In 
the cognitive sciences this capacity is now referred to as “mindreading”. Proponents of 
simulation theory claim that mindreading is typically carried out with minimal appeal to folk 
psychological rules. A simulation routine yields a pretend state which is subsequently 
attributed (as a genuine state) to a target agent. When simulation is successful, the pretend state 
reproduces the content and character of the target state. Empirical sources of support for 
simulation theory come from recent work on imitation, autism, empathy, and mirror neuron 
activity in primates. According to Alvin Goldman, the core concept of simulation is our best 
bet for understanding the mechanism of mindreading, as well as the foundations of social 
cognition and behavior. Goldman (2006) further maintains that in “high-level mindreading” the 
boundary between self and other remains intact, in contrast to the involuntary contagion that 
characterizes “low-level mindreading”. High-level simulational mindreading relies on a prior 
capacity for metacognition, that is, on the capacity to represent and classify one’s own mental 
states. Even if cognitive scientists take introspection to be an unreliable research method, says 
Goldman, it remains most plausible that high-level mindreaders rely on introspection in order 
to represent a target mental state. 
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 Along separate lines, Peter Carruthers (2009) and Dan Zahavi (2009) argue against 
Goldman’s version of simulation theory. Carruthers defends the model that first person 
metacognition results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves; mindreading is 
prior to metacognition, and introspection does not play any role in attributions of propositional 
attitudes (beliefs, desires, decisions). Zahavi argues that interpersonal understanding is (by 
default and particularly in face-to-face perceptual encounters) altogether free of both 
simulation and metacognition. Rather, everyday perception of others is direct and has 
contextual character. 
 I advance the above debate by isolating the functional role of metacognition in 
mindreading, thereby providing counter-arguments to both Carruthers and Zahavi. I claim that 
the function of metacognition is agent discrimination. Representation of foreign agency is 
explicit when the intentional object of the target state is concealed (for example, in cases where 
the object of the target agent’s visual state is hidden). In those cases, the missing content of the 
target state is explicitly represented as issuing from a foreign (spatial and perhaps temporal) 
point of orientation, (i.e. represented as if the simulator were in the target agent’s 
spatial/temporal location). This, in turn, is explained on my hypothesis that the content of the 
simulated state is indexically “flipped”, or inverted via introspection. Contrary to both 
Carruthers and Zahavi, mindreaders do indeed rely on metacognition. Discrimination of agency 
does not occur at the input stage. The output of metacognition is indexically formatted content, 
a functional requirement in cases when the intentional object of the target state is not directly 
available to the simulator. 
 
References: 
Carruthers, P. (2009). How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading 
and metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32, 121-192. 
Goldman, A. (2006). Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of 
Mindreading. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
Zahavi, D. (2009). Simulation, projection and empathy. Consciousness and Cognition 17, 514-
522. 
 
─────── 
 
BLOEM 
  
On the Origin of Emotions. 
A Closer Look at the Changing Semantics of the Verbs émouvoir and mouvoir. 
Annelies Bloem 
University of Ghent, Contragram 
Annelies.Bloem@gmail.com 
 
According to Geeraerts and Grondelaers (1995: 176), “the medieval physiological-
psychological theory of the four humors and the four temperaments has left its traces on our 
emotional vocabulary”. In this study, we would like to go a step further by showing how the 
changing conceptualisation in the era of Descartes also influenced our emotional lexicon. The 
XVIIth century can be considered as a key moment in the origin of modern emotive 
consciousness (see Bloem 2008). For instance, from this period on, the term émotion is used 
more frequently in a rather abstract sense in stead of the “mouvements de l’ame”, which was 
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commonly used till then in order to refer to emotional changes. In our analysis, we confront the 
semantic and syntactic profile of the verbs émouvoir and mouvoir in order to study their uses 
within the XVIIth century. Therefore, the attested occurrences are analysed in a semasiological 
way, inspired by Geeraerts (1997) prototype semantics. We especially peruse some 
encyclopaedic treaties like for instance Le tableau des passions humaines (1620), Les 
charactères des passions (1640), De l’usage des passions (1642) and Les passions de l’âme 
(1649). These works provide us with very important testimonies regarding the changing 
conceptualisation of emotions. In other words, we examine the evolution of émouvoir and 
mouvoir within reflections about the nature of emotions in order to demonstrate the close 
connection between culture and lexicon (see also Kövesces 2005, Gevaert 2005). 
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Bloem Annelies. 2008. “Et pource dit ausy Ypocras que u prin tans les melancolies se 
esmoeuvent. L’évolution sémantico-syntaxique des verbes mouvoir et émouvoir.” Dissertation. 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. 
Coeffeteau Nicolas. 1620. Tableau des passions humaines, de leurs causes et de leurs effets. 
Paris: S. Cramoisy. 
Cureau de la Chambre Marin. 1640-1662. Les Charactères des passions. 5 Volumes. Paris: 
chez Jacques D’Allin. 
Geeraerts Dirk & Grondelaers Stefan. 1995. “ Looking back at anger. Cultural traditions and 
metaphorical pattern.” Taylor J. & R. E. MacLaury (eds.). Language and the Cognitive 
Construal of the World. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 153-180. 
Geeraerts Dirk. 1997. Diachronic Prototype Semantics: A Contribution to Historical 
Lexicology. (Oxford Studies in Lexicography and Lexicology). Oxford: Clarendon. 
Gevaert Caroline 2005. “The anger is heat question: Detecting cultural influence on the 
conceptualization of anger through diachronic corpus analysis.” Delbecque N., J. van der 
Auwera & D. Geeraerts (eds.). Perspectives on Variation. Sociolinguistic, Historical, 
Comparative. 195-208. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 195-208. 
Kövecses Zoltán. 2005. Metaphor in Culture: Universality and Variation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge: University Press. 
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─────── 
 
BORZONE & AMADO 
 
Activity systems as cultural, cognitive and linguistic contexts for school practices  
Ana M. Borzone and Bibiana Amado  
CIIPME- National Council of Scientific Research- Argentina  
Perón 2158  
1040 Buenos Aires  
Argentina  
anabor@arnet.com.ar 
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This study aims to explore the nature of the cultural break between family and school 
environments in rural communities. To this end, the activity systems that incorporate funds of 
knowledge (Moll et al, 1992 ) and different rationality drills (Gachè, 2001; Gallegos, 2001) of 
a rural community of Córdoba, Argentina, were analyzed. The typical activities of that 
community are: the weave with palm leaves, the rearing of goats and chicken farm, the 
harvesting of herbs. Data were gathered by observations and audio and video registrations of 
the activities in the course of its development. Data were analyzed taking Engeström(1987 ) 
model as a reference. It was articulated with Gallegos’ categories: to Engeström’s subject 
category, knowledge about natural environment resources, techniques and purpose of the 
activity system, as described by Gallegos, were incorporated. The way children learn activity 
systems on interaction with others through their participation in these activities were also 
considered. Results showed that differences between home and school environments were 
neither restricted to differences in the dialectal uses of Spanish nor in having working 
knowledge of one or other subject: differences were found in knowledge identity. In effect, 
relevant differences were found in the prevalence of procedural knowledge over declarative 
one, in the use of an ecological autochthonous perspective to understand phenomena, in the 
ways to access knowledge, through direct experience, practice and participation in events in 
which the knowledge is used. Furthermore it was observed that a deep knowledge of an 
activity system, that is a complex and coherent mental representations of the events, objects 
and actions which constitute the system, favour children uses of certain discourse strategies. 
These strategies were not observed when information, far from their socio-cultural 
environment, was trying to be recovered. Due to the fact that activity systems are mental 
settings that allow children to recognize objects, purposes, to ply roles, to master practices, 
they can form a framework socially contextualized to have access to de-contextualized 
knowledge and to discursive and cognitive more complex operations that may allow children a 
better phenomena comprehension through language.  
 
References: 
Engeström, Y. (1987). Learning by expanding: an activity-theoretical approach to development 
research. Helsinski: Orienta-Konsultit.  
Gachè, J. (2001). El reto de una educación indígena amazónica: alcances provisionales. Cultura 
y Educación, 13, 59-72  
Gallegos, C. (2001). El curriculo de primaria basado en actividades como puente entre la 
cultura local y global: una experiencia educativa en la Amazonía peruana. Cultura y 
Educación, 13, 73-92. 
Moll, L.C., Armanti, C., Neff, D., & Gonzalez, N. (1992). Funds of knowledge for teaching: 
Using a qualitative approach to connect homes and classrooms. Theory into Practice, 31 (2), 
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BOTTINI & CASASANTO  
 
Implicit Spatial Length Modulates Time Estimates 
Roberto Bottini1,2 & Daniel Casasanto2 
University of Bergamo1, Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics2 
roberto.bottini@unibg.it, daniel.casasanto@mpi.nl 
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People often talk about time using spatial metaphors (e.g., a long meeting, a short vacation), 
more than the other way around. According to theories of metaphorical mental representation, 
this asymmetrical pattern in language reflects conceptual structure: representations of time 
depend asymmetrically on representations of space. Our previous studies support this 
hypothesis. In a series of non-linguistic psychophysical experiments, participants saw lines of 
various spatial lengths appear on the screen for varying durations. They estimated either the 
duration or the spatial displacement of each line, using mouse clicks. Results showed an 
asymmetric pattern of crossdimensional interference; participants could ignore temporal 
information when making judgments space, but they were unable to ignore irrelevant spatial 
information when making judgments about time (Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008, Cognition). 
 In these experiments, however, it was impossible for participants to estimate the relevant 
dimension without perceiving variation in the irrelevant dimension, as well. For example, when 
participants estimated the duration of a line, they could not avoid perceiving its displacement. 
Are perceptible spatial cues necessary to modulate representations of time, or might internally 
generated representations of space be sufficient? In the absence of explicit spatial cues, does 
the asymmetric relationship between space and time disappear?  
 To find out, in the present experiment we tested whether implicit spatial and temporal 
information encoded in nouns can influence estimates of time and space, respectively. Dutch 
participants saw words presented one at a time and reproduced either the duration for which 
they remained on the screen or their spatial length, using mouse clicks. In the duration 
estimation task, the target words named objects of various spatial lengths (e.g., pencil, 
clothesline, sidewalk). All target words had the same number of letters in Dutch, and therefore 
the same physical length on the screen. In the distance estimation task the target words named 
events of various durations (e.g., blink, party, season). Again, target words had the same 
number of letters, but they were presented with a varying number of spaces between letters (1-
9 spaces), for a fixed duration (3 seconds).  
 Implicit length modulated duration estimates, but not the other way around, consistent with 
metaphor theory. Words naming shorter objects (e.g., pencil) were estimated to remain on the 
screen for a shorter time, and words naming longer objects (e.g., clothesline, sidewalk) for a 
longer time (r=.75, p=.001). This was true even though the words named concrete objects with 
no intrinsic duration, and word meanings were irrelevant to the duration estimation task. By 
contrast, implicit temporal information encoded in event nouns had no effect on spatial 
estimation (r=.02, ns). The effect of implicit length on time estimates was greater than the 
effect of implicit duration on distance estimates (p=.05), thus cross-dimensional interference 
was asymmetric.  
 The asymmetric relationship between space and time found in previous experiments was 
observed here even in the absence of perceptible spatial cues. Explicit, perceptible spatial input 
is not necessary for space to influence duration estimates; implicit, internally generated 
representations of space are sufficient to modulate representations of time. 
 
 
─────── 
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CAËT & MORGENSTERN  
 
The self under construction 
Stéphanie Caët, Aliyah Morgenstern 
Université Sorbonne Nouvelle – Paris 3 
stephanie.caet@gmail.com; aliyah.morgenstern@gmail.com 
 
Before the age of 2;6, different markers are used by French-speaking children as they talk 
about themselves. They can either use the null form (∅), preverbal vowels or filler syllables 
(Peters & Menn, 1993), third (il/elle), second (tu) and first (je) person pronouns, or their first 
name. The concept of person and self is therefore independent from the grammatical category 
of personal pronouns (Pavlovitch, 1920), and the emergence of the first person pronoun “je” (I) 
can hardly be considered as the first and only marker of self-awareness (Stern & Stern, 1907). 
 Each of these selfwords fulfills particular functions and refer to different facets of the 
child’s self (Nelson, 1989). On the one hand, "Baby" and the first name refer to the physical 
self. On the other hand, the first person pronoun “je” (I) refers to the social self in interaction 
with others. None of these aspects of the self is a priori more difficult or more intense than the 
other. Instead, the use of “je” may rather be related to the complexity of the linguistic system, 
as the first person pronoun “je” (I) both refers to the grammatical subject of a sentence and the 
speaker of an utterance in interaction (Jespersen 1922, Sabeau-Jouannet 1975). After 2;6, the 
use of the first person “je” (I) is stabilized and fulfills both its grammatical and interactional 
functions. 
 In this study, we analyze the interdependence between the development of language and the 
development of the self in the speech of two typically developing French-speaking children, 
Madeleine and Théophile, from the Paris Corpus (Morgenstern & Parisse, 2007) on the 
CHILDES database (MacWhinney, 2000), between the age of 1;0 and 3;6. Both children are 
raised in similar conditions by their two parents and come from upper middle-class families, 
but they have very different courses of language development. The comparison between their 
uses of selfwords in various contexts therefore gives us insights on the assertion of their 
subjectivity and its correlation with children’s linguistic competences. 
 Our preliminary results show that although Madeleine uses first person pronouns much 
earlier than Théophile (at 2;01 for Madeleine and 2;07 for Théophile), both children use 
selfwords in comparable ways: null subjects, fillers and first person subject pronouns express 
projects and desires, whereas first names and first person strong pronouns “moi” (me) express 
contrastive agency. Both children use third person pronouns when referring to themselves in 
narratives in which they are involved, as they seem to take an adult’s perspective on their own 
acts. 
 The mastery of the first person pronoun “je” thus comes after a disjunction between the 
marking of the child as contrastive agent, as source of affects, desires and projects and as 
speaker. As the acquisition process continues, the child joins those three dimensions in one 
marker: “je” (I), showing a full appropriation of language and intersubjectivity. 
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Within identity studies, many researchers note that identity is formed, maintained, and 
modified through interaction (Beard 2004) and people are involved in a constant management 
of their identities. Because self cannot be reduced to cognition, identity remains intact long 
after the impairment of cognitive functions (Beard 2004). Arguably, if people with dementia 
continue to experience ‘self’ through all stages of the illness, then the primary cause of the 
experienced identity loss may be how those they interact with react to and view them (Sabat & 
Harrè 1992). According to the literature, such loss can potentially be prevented, then, if people 
relating to the diagnosed persons refrain from positioning them as lacking.  
 In the present contribution, we report findings from an ethnographic study conducted, by 
the author, during home visits with Alzheimer's Disease (AD) patients and those who care for 
them. It is offer an in-depth examination of: (a) samples of interactions between the researcher, 
caregivers and AD patients; (b) field notes and (c) samples of narratives of carers. We focus on 
the notion that (non-)linguistic acts are (multiply) embedded in discourse (Ruhi & Isik-Guler 
2007) and consider relational practices that involve face and concepts of self that impinge on 
face. The questions we address in the study are: (1) How do caregivers deal with face and 
aspects of the (patient) self-in-interaction? (2) How do patients deal with face and aspects of 
the self-in-interaction? (3) What implications can be inferred at the clinical level?  
 In our analysis, some practices reveal what can be called a ‘de vivo luctus’, a process by 
which the patient is spoken about as if (s)he was dead. There are, howevere, more complex 
interactional goals accomplished by caregivers: our analyses imply that relational work in these 
settings involve tensions between achieving the interactional goals of presenting a preillness 
face of the patients and attending to the actual feelings of the patients, with a stronger tendency 
to preserving the pre-illness face. These results find a correlation in Post (1995) notion of 
‘now’ and ‘then’ selves experienced by AD patients. 
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 Our analysis hypothesizes that relational work may contribute to the split between ‘now’ 
and ‘then’ selves and that this fact is due to conflicting needs of caregivers. While further 
research is required in other kinds of settings, this finding has significant implications 
regarding the motivation for split-selves and for (im)politeness practices toward AD patients. 
Clinical implications can be drawn from these results, such as implementing discoursive and 
interactional strategies supporting patients self-survival. 
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This paper attempted a contrastive study of the concept friend in American English and its 
Turkish counterpart arkadaş (friend). As a type of “meaningful relationship” Kovesces (2000) 
investigated the concept of friendship in American English and analyzed the metaphors 
entailed. Although Kovesces’s study was inspirational on its own for further studies, it was 
incomplete in itself since it lacked a detailed analysis of semantic fields of friend that would in 
turn supply more information about the mappings of metaphors. Therefore, before using 
Kovesces’ metaphorical analysis of friendship as a framework for the contrastive analysis of 
friend in American English and arkadaş in Turkish, this study first explored the semantic fields 
through dictionary studies and corpus-driven data. Thus, it used translations as in Aijmer and 
Simon-Venderbergen (2004) for a contrastive study of the concepts English friend and Turkish 
arkadaş and dost to determine how they relate to each other semantically and pragmatically 
and how semantic fields in different languages relate to one another. The main aim of such a 
study was to find out whether these semantic fields correspond to each other or not and if they 
do not, whether there is any other word in Turkish that would correspond to those meanings 
lacking in arkadaş. It was then the paper explored whether or not Kovesces’ metaphors for the 
English friendship concept correspond to the same metaphors for the Turkish friendship 
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concept. The possible definitions of the word friend in English and the words arkadaş and dost 
in Turkish were identified. Based on these definitions, the language samples were collected 
using the Corpus of Contemporary American English for the English friend and METU 
Turkish Corpus for the Turkish arkadaş and dost. The samples were confined to the sentences 
in extended context from one specific genre, “newspaper/haber” and to the dates 1990-2000 as 
samples from the genre “spoken” were not present in the METU Turkish Corpus and 
newspaper was the genre closest to spoken samples. 55 sentences for the English friend, 25 
sentences for the Turkish arkadaş and 37 sentences for the Turkish dost were collected. The 
words under study were translated either as single items or as phrases into the target language 
with a consideration of “the words in context.” In response to the first research question of 
whether the semantic fields of English friend and Turkish arkadaş overlap, and if not, whether 
Turkish has another word that corresponds to those meanings lacking in arkadaş, the study 
showed that the core meaning of English friend and Turkish arkadaş do not exhibit a one-to-
one correspondence and the missing elements of English friend in Turkish arkadaş are 
captured in the core meaning of Turkish dost. With respect to the second research question, 
whether the metaphors for American English friend Kovesces defined correspond to the 
metaphors in Turkish arkadaş,the study showed that excluding the metaphors of machine and 
plant the Turkish arkadaş encompasses the metaphors of American English friend, which 
include sharing objects, distance, warmth, bond, economic exchange, building, implement, 
journey, and valuable commodity.  
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The normativity of linguistic meaning in natural language is a topic of present 
philosophical discussion. The lack of a precise account of the deontic dimension in 
linguistic use and interpretation has nourished a debate pondering whether linguistic 
meaning is normative “in any interesting sense”.1 Surprisingly, this debate uncritically 
assumes that conditions of semantic correctness should be the source of this 
normativity. This presentation proposes an alternative source and argues why it is 
comparatively more adequate than conditions of semantic correctness. 
 We will show that the debate assumes that the cornerstone of semantic constraints, 
felicitous uses, and mistakes should be our hypothetical or categorical duty to utter 
correct application (true or assertible) expressions. For any expression (a word, sentence 
or discourse) S, speaker A, and any time t, the discussion revolves different versions of: 
(SC)  If S means f for A at t, then S ought to apply S to an object x only if x is f at 
t.2  
 
 Those who contend that linguistic meaning is normative “in any interesting sense” 
pose interesting objections and counterexamples to (SC) and thereby reject 
normativism. 3 The normativist reaction consists in proposing different interpretations of 
(SC) to explain or dismiss the counterexamples advanced by the anti-normativists.4  
 Then, we will introduce an alternative source to (SC). We propose to study how a 
certain triangular relation of expectations between a speaker, an interpreter and their 
common interlocutors can explain the force that semantic norms exert on our linguistic 
interactions. Very succinctly, 
(Interlocutor)  A can mean f by S at t if A can expect at t that B and any interlocutor 
of A and B to act accordingly and if B can expect at t that A and any interlocutor of A 
and B to act accordingly.  
 This structure is based on the idea that a prescription or permission acquires force on 
the basis of repetition and reciprocity of expectations in a multi-perspective 
consideration of a dialogue. This configuration involves not only a speaker and an 
interpreter, as it also observes the relationship of these participants with a certain 
potential witness of their conversation, an interlocutor for both. 
 We will explain examples that (SC) cannot account for in the interlocutor structure. 
For instance, while (SC) has difficulties in accounting for the semantic normativity of 
intentionally insincere expressions,5 (Interlocutor) can give a concrete explanation. 
 We will also argue why this approach is more adequate than (SC) regarding different 
aspects of semantic normativity, such as cross-perspective validity of norms, and 
tolerance for norm change.6 In many dialogues, we are not able to judge whether our 
partner speaks the truth, and yet, we can evaluate whether s/he is a competent language 
speaker. As regards norm change, a diachronic focus shows how examples of meaning 
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narrowing do not seem to go in hand with changes in correctness conditions, and can 
instead be accommodated by a new triangular configuration of expectations. 
 
Notes 
1 Like Boghossian (2005), as cited in Whiting (2007) 
2 Cf. Whiting (2007). 
3 Cf. Glüer & Wikforss (2009a), (2009b), (2009c); Hattiangadi (2006), Wikforss, Å. (2001). Their main 
motivation is to reject the conclusions against semantic naturalism and dispositionalism that apparently 
follow from Kripke’s (1982), chapter.X. 
4 Cf. e.g., Whiting, D. (2007), (2008). 
5 Cf. Hattiangadi’s (2006) example about Matilda (Who Told Such Dreadful Lies). 
6 An extensive evaluation is developed in Crespo (2009). 
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The balance of the mental lexicon in French-German and French-Italian late 
bilinguals. An attrition study? 
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Researchers in the fields of second language learning and the loss of language skills 
(attrition) still argue about the aspects of language that might be affected by either a late 
acquisition or a non-use. Suppositions concerning cognitive processing and native (L1) 
and foreign (L2) language representation as well as its organization in late bilinguals 
remain controversial. Investigating lexical processing necessarily tends to a discussion 
about cognitive capacity: more low level processes are automated, less they need of 
cognitive capacity, and a greater number of them will be integrated by high-level 
processes. Thus, a priming effect seems more likely for bilinguals with a high 
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proficiency level in both languages. The conception of different processing-levels is 
based on the principle of modularity, stating that the processingsystem consists of a 
high-level central system having access to the complete information, contained in 
"modules" specialized in the processing of low level data. Haven taken into account 
several informative studies, we created a set of stimuli supposed to bring some light into 
the obscurity of bilingual cognitive functioning. Thus, we considered reaction times and 
error rates in a primed bilingual lexical decision task-paradigm (BLDT) with non-
cognate translation equivalents. In the related priming condition, the target was the 
translation equivalent of the prime or a pseudoword created by a negative transfer from 
the prime languages’ phonological or morphological aspects. To test L1 and L2 
language storage, we produced an unrelated supraliminal priming condition, where 
prime and target were semantically non associated in the neighbour language. Our 
participants were German (French) immigrants to France (Germany) and French 
(Italian) immigrants to Italy (France) and two additional control groups of native 
German (French) and French (Italian) speakers without (or with less) notions of the 
neighbour language. Speed and accuracy of lexical decisions showed that second 
language proficiency (revealed by C-Tests) is directly related to language processing, 
and that a high level of proficiency shows equal processing in the BLDT for both 
languages. Sociolinguistic predictors like age, age of acquisition and length of residence 
served to predict C-Test scores. There is also evidence for cross-language priming: in 
contrast to the unrelated condition, in the related condition the preactivation of the 
concept by the prime reduces decision times significantly; this could be interpreted in 
favour of a (partly) common store for L1 and L2 language representation. Late 
bilinguals with a high level of L2 competence seemed to tolerate L2 interferences in L1 
rather than L2 pseudowords. Latter observation can be interpreted as a sign of L1 
attrition, where the balance of the mental lexicon tends to the L2 side. The results are 
discussed within the context of conceptual mediation vs. lexical association debate, and 
in light of the integrated model of neurolinguistic organization. 
 
Keywords: lexical access, attrition, bilingualism, interference, mental lexicon, response 
time, bilingual priming, lexical decision task 
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Lexical and non-lexical resources for disfluency 
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Actual language use, especially conversation, is full of disfluency. People often fail to 
smoothly produce syntactically perfect sentences. Features of disfluency such as pauses, 
sound stretches and tokens like uh or um are generally discussed under the rubric of 
repair. Studies in Conversation Analysis have revealed that repairs are not just errors in 
performance, but are often used by speakers to cope with various kinds of problems that 
arise during conversation (Schegloff 1979). It has also been discovered that the 
mechanisms of repair differ in languages with different syntactic features (Fox et al. 
1996). However, variations among disfluency features or differences among languages 
have not yet given enough analysis. 
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 In this study, I focus on a demonstrative-derived filler neige ‘that thing’ and 
tongueclicking in Mandarin conversation. Neige is what Hayashi and Yoon (2006) call a 
‘placeholder demonstrative’. It typically works as a filler, especially when a speaker is 
engaging in a wordsearch. Tongue-clicking is not phonemic in Mandarin, but is often 
heard in natural conversation. Neither neige nor tongue-clicking is supposed to occur in 
a planned, formal speech. In casual conversation, however, both are fairly frequent and 
are generally associated with disfluency. 
 Through the examination of videotaped natural conversations among native speakers 
of Mandarin Chinese, which amount to approximately 20 hours, I found the following 
tendencies. Neige generally occurs in the middle of a sentence, surrounded by pauses. 
Speakers, unable to remember a certain word, produce the word neige in its place. By 
the use of neige, speakers indicate that mental processing is still in progress. In contrast, 
tongue-clicking is often observed at the beginning of a sentence: After tongue-clicking, 
speakers tend to produce a full sentence rather quickly. What has come before is often 
not a complete sentence. Speakers abandon what they have been producing before a 
tongue-clicking. By making a tongue-clicking, speakers indicate that they are making a 
new start. 
 In Asian languages, placeholder demonstratives like neige are widely observed in 
other languages such as Japanese are ‘that thing’ and Korean kuke ‘that thing’. The 
functions of these words have a lot in common. On the other hand, tongue-clicking is 
much less frequent in Japanese than in Korean and Chinese. This study thus 
demonstrates the division-of-labor between a lexical and a non-lexical resource for 
disfluency in Mandarin conversation and touches upon the difference among languages. 
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I propose that a distinguishing characteristic of literature is that it hides its situation of 
utterance. Writers from John Lyons to Stéphane Robert have presented deixis as a 
demonstration of “the pivotal role of situation of utterance in language”. As a means of 
exploring my claim I examine the notion, popularised by Stephen C. Levinson, that 
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frames of reference are necessary in any linguistic or gestural indication of spatiality. 
My paper is a reflection on the human perception of space rather than an essay in author 
criticism.  
 Existing work on literary pragmatics has asked whether literature should be 
perceived as a type of ordinary or deviant language. It has also encountered difficulty 
with the fact that literary deictic reference can indicate both within and beyond the 
boundaries of a particular text.  
 Hoping to move beyond such cruxes, I look at the frames of spatial reference of a 
short story, Bernard Malamud’s “The Letter” (1973). This immediately raises two 
points. First, that a work of literature containing dialogue and the point of view of a 
fictional character positioned at some remove from the narrating voice presents 
character-based deictics or the spatial frames of reference of characters. Secondly, that 
implicit assumptions are being made about which particular extra-textual places will be 
known by readers and how well.  
 In particular, “The Letter” refers to institutions formerly known as county farms or 
lunatic asylums and later as psychiatric hospitals, which existed in Suffolk County, New 
York, in north-eastern Long Island, between the 1880s and the 1990s. Knowing about 
these and Malamud’s relationship to them (his mother and brother were both 
schizophrenics committed there) enriches but cannot be essential to a reading of the 
story.  
 Within this reading, the notion of the situation of utterance of the author being 
precisely what makes a particular piece of language literary emerges as an answer to the 
problem of literature as ordinary or deviant language. A key point is that literature is not 
just language, but also a cultural and mental phenomenon. As J.E. Malpas has written, 
literature has a peculiar resonance and significance in philosophical discussions of 
human spatial perception.  
 Following Levinson’s work on linguistic deixis, and recalling the globalised study of 
prose fiction proposed by Franco Moretti, reflection on frames of reference in “The 
Letter” suggests a further direction for literary research: comparative study of literary 
spatial indexicality in texts with differing cultural and linguistic contexts. Seeing 
literature as concealment, finally, counteracts the widespread opinion that it is a type of 
revelation. In choosing an artistic literary treatment of his personal experience of – 
among other things – spatiality in “The Letter”, Malamud attempted classically literary 
tasks such as the transfiguration of experience and its move from a local to a universal 
human level (so that the story becomes one about masculinity, father-son relations or 
the meaning of sanity, rather than about 1950s Long Island). This transfiguration is 
precisely the consequence of the fact that in literature, a speaker hides the position from 
which he or she speaks.  
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The implicit causality effect in verbs describing interpersonal scenarios biases 
participants’ attribution of causality in an event (who brought the event about) towards 
the sentence-subject in action (e.g., help) and state-action (e.g., frighten) verbs, but to 
the sentence-object for state verbs (e.g., hates) (see Rudolph & Forsterling, 1997, for a 
review). The present study further extends this research to the effect of semantic 
domain, language and culture on implicit causality.  
 In order to assess how generalizable the effect is, verb items were balanced across 
three semantic domains: emotion, cognition and vision. Within each domain, items were 
balanced on the basis of verb type (i.e., same number of state- and state-action verbs). If 
previously reported findings hold, it would be expected that emotion verbs would 
present the typical bias pattern with state-verbs such as hate showing an object-bias but 
state-action verbs such as frighten showing a subject-bias. However, the prediction is 
unclear for cognition or vision verbs as such domains were under-represented in 
previous studies.  
 Although the implicit causality effect has been found in a number of Western 
languages investigated in independent studies, the present study utilizes the same set of 
verbs to investigate possible differences in implicit causality linked to specific aspects 
of individual languages within the European, Western culture, and between Western vs. 
non-Western cultures including, namely, mainland China, Iran and Turkey.  
 English, Finnish, Hungarian, Mandarin, Persian, Polish, Serbian and Turkish native 
speakers (N=250 university students, 50% female) were assessed on a task in which 
each verb item was presented within S-V-O sentences. Participants were asked to 
complete a causal inference (Why does S verb O?... because……) and responses were 
categorised as based on ‘something about S’ or ‘something about O’. The results 
showed consistent implicit causality effects for the emotion domain. Some differences 
emerged for mental and visual domains, which will be tentatively explained on the basis 
of varying folk psychological beliefs about the origin of the experiences described by 
the verbs across cultures. 
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John Searle and Michael Tomasello offer two of the most influential accounts of shared or 
collective intentionality. I argue that Tomasello’s appropriation of Searle hides important 
differences between their views and that neither paints a satisfactory picture of human 
sociality.  
 Tomasello (2008) argues that, while both human and non-human primates engage in 
social activities and communicate with one another, non-humans have merely individual 
intentionality (“I intend”). Only humans have shared intentionality (“we intend”). This 
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involves joint attentional frames, recursive mind-reading, as well as the ability to use 
language and conventional gestures more broadly.  
 In contrast, Searle (1995) holds that many non-human animals have shared 
intentionality. Hyenas, for example, have collective intentionality and their hunting together 
constitutes a social fact just as two people going for a walk together is a social fact (Searle 
1995: 26). Attributing collective intentionality means attributing the ability to “engage in 
cooperative behavior” and to “share intentional states such as beliefs, desires, and 
intentions” (23). Collective intentionality is “a biologically primitive phenomenon” (24) but 
not distinctively human. What non-human animals lack are institutions and conventions, 
and these require language (itself, Searle acknowledges, an institution). Thus, institutional 
facts form a subclass of social facts. What allows humans to have social institutions is that 
they, unlike other animals, have the capacity not only to follow instrumental rules, but to 
formulate and follow constitutive rules.  
 One could argue that the above is merely a semantic difference; after all, Searle and 
Tomasello both identify language and the ability to institute conventions as the special 
purview of humans. Yet Searle thinks non-human animals such as wolves are capable of 
shared beliefs and other mental states, whereas Tomasello thinks that even non-human 
primates lack this ability. So, on the one hand, Tomasello seems to have a higher standard 
of intersubjectivity than Searle and, on the other hand, Searle, by emphasising institutions, 
seems to give greater weight to the role of culture. I aim to show that the difference between 
them illustrate ways in which both their accounts remain inadequately social.  
 Although Tomasello agrees with Searle that shared intentionality is irreducible, he 
unwittingly undermines this claim by using Grice to explicate recursive mind-reading 
(Tomasello 2008: 82). For the Gricean reconstruction of communication in terms of 
nested intentions tends to reduce intersubjectivity to individual intentions. This threatens 
the distinctiveness of shared intentionality. A similar critique can be raised against 
Searle. He relegates to the back of the book what he admits to be a fourth element of 
social reality (in addition to the assignment of function, collective intentionality, and 
constitutive rules), namely, the background. By “background,” he means a set of 
capacities (causal structures) that make intentional states possible, but are not 
themselves intentional. Searle makes no reference in this context to shared intentional 
states or ways in which the Background is shared. As a result, the social remains 
radically underdeveloped on his account. Hence both Tomasello’s and Searle’s 
explanations of human social reality are flawed. 
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The evolution of language development: beyond a recapitulationist evolutionary 
psychology  
Antoni Gomila  
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While the old dictum that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny” was rejected in Biology 
long ago, it looks as if it is held dear in the area of the evolution of cognition, and 
language in particular. Of course, it is not explicitly asserted and defended, but it is 
rather usual to find evolutionary proposals that extrapolate phylogenetic scenarios from 
developmental analysis and viceversa: comparative studies (babies vis a vis apes, for 
instance) are often taken to apply to hominid ancestors without further ado. It looks as if 
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what is explicitly rejected in general, is implicitly taken for granted, at least in some 
quarters.  
 Some examples from language evolution may illustrate what I have in mind. Robert 
Burling, for instance, has suggested that the clue as to how words appeared in evolution 
may resemble the way in which infants go from ritualized gestures (also called 
movements of intention) to conventionalized gestures, and has also looked for examples 
of ritualized gestures in primates as indication of what was already achivable by 
hominids ancestor (Burling, 1993, 2000). It has also been proposed that the only guide 
to the evolution of phonetic structure is infant ontogenesis (Studdert-Kennedy, 2000, 
and the whole section on phonetic structure which it introduces).  
 In these cases, the ontogenetic evidence is used as a heuristic to generate 
phylogenetic hypothesis, and viceversa. The basic problem with this strategy is that it 
overlooks the bare fact that development itself was part of the phylogenetic process, 
which, in the human case, has clearly amounted to a process of increasing phenotypic 
plasticity. However, a highly active approach to the evolution of cognition, mainstream 
Evolutionary Psychology (Barlow, Cosmides, Tooby, 1992; Pinker, 2001), seems to be 
commited to a version of recapitulationism, because of its massive modularist and 
nativist assumptions: its selectionist view of evolution carries over to a nativist and 
modularist view of ontogeny. While E.P. has recently been the target of several 
criticisms, it is its conception of development that I find most problematic. In this paper, 
I will argue that mainstream Evolutionary Psychology exemplifies the recapitulationist 
thesis and that such lineal view of the relationship between phylogenetic and 
ontogenetic evolution is an important reason to reject their programme; I will also focus 
on the question of the proper relationship between development and evolution, 
focussing in particular in the case of language.  
 So, I will first bring into the open the reasons why this kind of reasoning is not 
guaranteed; why the recapitulation thesis is not a satisfactory guide to the relationship 
between ontogeny and phylogeny of cognition (and language in particular). Next, I will 
try to show that mainstream Evolutionary Psychology is commited to a version of the 
recapitulationist thesis, given the way it conceives of human development. Finally, I 
will try to clarify the proper way to think of the relationship between ontogeny and 
phylogeny, and the methodological implications it has for the proper constraining of 
evolutionary hypotheses. 
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Prepositional semantics: contrasting native speakers’ opinions with language teachers’ 
and the linguist’s 
Anton Granvik 
University of Helsinki 
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The aim of my paper is to address the notions of prepositional meaning and semantics 
from different perspectives. Drawing on an ongoing corpus-based study of the Spanish 
preposition de, I have tested the results of the linguistic analysis with some empirical 
studies in order to see to what degree the results converge and differ. An important 
reference is Sandra & Rice’s (1995) paper tackling the same question regarding the 
English spatial prepositions at, on and in, but my study also builds on a series of works 
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by Raukko (1995, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2002), who emphasizes the importance of ”non-
linguists’ intuitions as evidence for significant meaning differences in the polysemy of a 
word” (Raukko 1997: 164). 
 The corpus-based analysis lays on a diachronic sample of Spanish literary texts, 
comprising a total of over 16 000 usages of de. The data retrieved from this study has 
resulted in a schematic characterization of the semantic structure of de, consisting of 
four main senses, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
    
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the four main senses of Spanish de. 
 
In the empirical study these findings are tested by the use of questionnaires directed to 
two different groups of informants. On the one hand, 20 Finnish non-native professional 
Spanish teachers filled out the questionnaires; on the other hand, the same 
questionnaires were completed by 20 Spanish native speakers without linguistic 
education. Two different types of questionnaires were used, providing us with 10 
answers per questionnaire from each group. 
 The questionnaires were built up according to the following lines: The first one has 
as its starting point the different senses of de and the informants were asked to provide 
“typical” examples of each sense, adding information on the reasons leading to his/her 
choice. The second one is a sorting task, in which the informants were asked to sort 30 
sentences containing the preposition de (taken from our own corpus) into groups 
according to semantic similarity. 
 In general, the results of the empirical studies corroborate the theoretical findings 
based on the linguistic material, suggesting that the schematic representation does 
reflect the most important aspects of the semantics of de. However, the empirical 
inquiries raise further questions in showing that natural extensions such as that between 
space and time do not seem to be as clearly related in speakers minds. Here an important 
difference is seen between the non-native professionals and the naïve native speakers. 
The first clearly see a similarity between the spatial, temporal and, to lesser degree, 
abstract realization of the idea of origin, separation, while the native speakers do so to a 
much lower extent. Furthermore, the data retrieved from the questionnaires clearly 
shows that there are differences in salience between the proposed four main senses, 
possession and origin being the ones most easily and consequently recognized. 
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When working on multimodal metaphors in film it turns out that not all their 
realizations reside on the level of speech and gesture. Rather multimodal metaphors in 
film are composed as highly orchestrated audiovisual structures, which we describe as 
a specific form of Expressive Movement (Ausdrucksbewegung) (Kappelhoff 2004, 
2008a). We will show that metaphoricity and expressive movements reside on the level 
of form, i.e. on the level of verbo-gestural and audiovisual modalities and the unfolding 
of the specific composition in time. To illustrate this, we will draw upon examples from 
Classical Hollywood Cinema: Film noir and films of Alfred Hitchcock.  
 The method for the analysis of Expressive Movement is based on film-analytical 
concepts of cinematic expressivity (Bellour 2005; Deleuze 1986; Kappelhoff 2004), 
resting on the assumption that the audiovisual composition models perceptual 
experience of the spectators specifically (Sobchack 1992; Kappelhoff 2008b). Since 
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audiovisual images are inherently temporarily orchestrated, Expressive Movement is 
realised in the cinematic perception as a particular dynamic pattern of sensation and 
sentiment. Rather than conceiving of film as a represented world of objects, 
Kappelhoff’s method (Kappelhoff 2004) reconstructs the dynamic and temporarily 
organized aesthetic structure. Composing the cinematographic image, this structure is 
orchestrated by the interplay of film techniques like editing, camera movements, sound 
design, and so on. For metaphorically motivated units of Expressive Movement we draw 
on microanalysis both on the level of film composition and multimodal metaphors. 
Linguistic identification and analysis of multimodal metaphors rests upon Müller's 
cognitive-linguistic dynamic approach of the activation of metaphoricity (Müller 2008; 
Müller & Cienki 2009; Müller & Tag subm.).  
 Our interdisciplinary approach reveals mechanisms and techniques of activated 
metaphoricity that can clearly be determined and described on the level of cinematic 
expressivity. In both disciplines research on multimodal metaphors has recently gained 
weight: examples in linguistics are Forceville & Urios-Aparasi 2009, Rubba 2008, 
Oakley & Tobin 2009; in media and communication studies: Fahlenbrach 2008. These 
approaches raise important issues on multimodal metaphors with respect to their 
meaning, function, underlying concepts, and the narrative. The new perspective we offer 
is a form-based account of the specific aesthetic structure of audiovisual orchestrations 
as a time based mode of expressivity, intertwining the dynamic activation of 
metaphoricity and Expressive Movement.  
 The talk therefore will document how a close collaboration between film scholars 
and cognitive linguists enlightens aspects of multimodal metaphor so far unaccounted 
for in current takes on this phenomenon.  
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This paper examines the characteristics and functions of the linguistic evaluations 
colored by the speaker/writer’s overt or covert presence in the cognitive evaluative 
processes. As the adjectival category constitutes the canonical linguistic realization of 
evaluations (Martin and White 2005:58), this paper focuses on the evaluations encoded 
by Mandarin adjectives, though the generalizations can be applied to other evaluative 
categories as well.  
 As illustrated in various studies regarding evaluation (or ‘stance’ and ‘appraisal’ in 
different traditions), linguistic evaluation can be distinguished in aspects such as averred 
or attributed, explicit or implicit, inscribed or invoked, etc.(cf. Hunston, 2000; Martin 
and White, 2005; Bednarek, 2006, 2009; among others). However, this paper proposes 
that a dimension of subjective/objective evaluation can, and should be recognized. 
 Based on the degree of the speaker/writer’s self-involvement, a tripartite distinction 
of objective, intersubjective and subjective evaluations can be recognized. They form an 
evaluation continuum, with objective evaluation and subjective evaluation at two ends. 
The evaluation can be carried out on the basis of the evaluator’s perceptual or empirical 
experience, deduction, conceptual knowledge, etc.  
 This paper holds that emotional adjectives (including physical reaction adjectives) 
(e.g., angry, sad, surprised, hungry, sore) are typically realized as subjective 
evaluations, since the speaker/writer’s emotional evaluation is based on his/her 
experiential feelings (first-person senser), or his/her deductions (other-person senser). 
For non-emotional adjectives, this paper proposes that objective evaluation is derived 
from the evaluator’s reference to some explicit (or objectively present) standards, 
whereas subjective evaluation is an outcome of the evaluator’s comparison or reference 
to his/her internalized standards, such as 1) the construed stereotypical value of the 
evaluated category, or 2) the evaluator’s idiosyncratic expectations. Such subjective 
reference points, though implicit in linguistic expressions, are actually present in the 
evaluator’s macro cognitive domain.  
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 In some occasions, people objectivize their evaluations so that their opinions may 
seem more generalized and credible to others. In other situations, people deliberately 
subjectivize their evaluations in order to achieve special pragmatic effects (such as 
consolation, euphemistic). 
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In my PhD study on language disorders in MS, my first objective is to profile language 
disorders in spontaneous speech of native Finnish speaking MS patients. My second 
objective is to find out what kind of effect cognitive fatigue has on the language of MS 
patients. In this paper, I will discuss a narrative-based method I have developed in order 
to assess cohesion and coherence in narratives told by MS patients.  
 It is only during the last decades the cognitive aspects of MS have drawn attention 
(LaRocca & Kalb 2006), even though according to some studies up to 50–66 % of MS 
patients show cognitive difficulty (Peyser et al. 1990). The research on communicative 
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disorders, on the other hand, has largely concentrated on the motor disorders of speech, 
and not on language disorders (Murdoch & Theodoros 2000).  
 For this study, I have interviewed 20 MS patients with definite MS, and 20 healthy 
controls matched for age, gender and education. Interviews were based on picture 
material (e.g. Frog Stories). In addition, the participants have been assessed on a 
neuropsychological test battery.  
The starting point for my analysis is an article by Ash et al (2006) about discourse 
impairments in aphasia and dementia. I have further developed their method as a more 
precise tool was needed in the analysis of cohesion and coherence in the speech of MS 
patients. This method has potential of being used as a tool in MS diagnosis in the future.  
 The results of the analysis show that MS patients concentrate more on details in the 
stories on the expense of the whole narrative. Results on weakened cohesion and 
coherence in telling narratives concur with other studies that show MS patients tend to 
have problems in their executive functions (Murdoch & Theodoros 2000).  
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Itkonen (2006) and Zlatev (2007) have paid attention to the current situation in 
cognitive linguistics in which the concept of norm or convention is undervalued. Zlatev 
analyses carefully the relationship between between language and concept of 
embodiment. He concludes that language is fundamentally a sociocultural phonomenon, 
based on grammatical and semantic conventions, and therefore cannot be reduced to 
individual minds, and even less so to brains (Zlatev 2007). Hutchins (2001, 2005) has 
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presented arguments for a similar position showing through ethnographic research the 
importance of social and cultural level. 
 What is then the ontological status of linguistic norms? Itkonen (2006) makes a 
distinction between the intersubjective or social conventions or norms and the subjective 
or individualpsychological knowledge of them. He further refers to the subjective and 
fallible knowledge through which an individual has an 'access' to social norms (ibid, see 
also Itkonen 1978). Where can these social norms be found and what is the nature of the 
of process in which an individual accesses the social norms?  
 These are the central questions discussed in this paper. 
 Zlatev, Persson and Gärdenfors (2005) represent the concept of bodily mimesisas a 
means to link the concept of embodiment to language. Bodily mimesis is defined as a 
particular act of cognition or communication which involves crossmodality, volition, 
representation, and communicative sign function. By representation they refer to a 
situation in which the body and its motion are differentiated from and understood to 
correspond either iconically or indexically to some action, object or event (see also 
Zlatev 2007). Vygotsky investigated child development and how this was guided by the 
role of culture and interpersonal communication (Vygotsky 1962). Vygotsky observed 
how higher mental functions developed historically in cultural groups andindividually 
through social interactions. Through these interactions, a child learns the habits of 
her/his culture, including speech patterns, written language, and other symbolic 
knowledge. The specific knowledge gained by children represents the shared knowledge 
of a culture including the norms related to language use. This process is known as 
internalization and the opposite process as externalization. We discuss how linguistic 
norms emerge, evolve, and disintegrate at a sociocultural level, how the norms are 
internalized and externalized by individuals, how they are followed or occasionally 
deliberately not followed, and how they are implicitly represented in linguistic 
expressions and explicitly represented as externalized rules. We make a careful 
distinction between generating and creating language. We also discuss the relationship 
between the subjective element in linguistic rule following and the private language 
argument (Wittgenstein 1953), and if and when rule following can be considered as a 
probabilistic or statistical phenomenon. 
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The aim of our study was to show that distributions of hyperlinks within wikipedia 
corpora implicitly contain information about cultural preferences of its authors. We 
have transformed wikipedia corpora written in 27 different languages into graph 
structures whose vertices correspond to wikipedia articles and edges to hyperlinks 
between these articles. No other content information was taken into account. Afterwards 
we have calculated PageRank vectors for every one of these graphs, thus obtaining so-
called “intracultural importance list” for every linguistic community under study. Two 
datamining experiments were performed with obtained data: “the top country” study 
showed that labels of articles concerning countries, related to linguistic community that 
created these articles are to be found in the top parts of their respective intracultural lists 
and inversely that the top parts of these lists can be potentially used as a stylometric 
method of identification of the community which created the corpus (c.f. Table 1). 
Having thus demonstrated that the culture-specific information is present in the order of 
the intracultural lists, we have pursued our second study further by comparing 
intracultural lists among themselves, hence obtaining socalled intercultural lists. We 
have generated such intercultural lists for many different symbols denoting culture-
specific foods, religions or historical events. While majority of the results seem to be 
intuitively appealing (e.g. the position of wine concept much more higher in french 
wikipedia than in arabic one; the position of orthodox church much higher in greek 
corpus than in Spanish etc.. ) we find it somewhat difficult to assess the validity of our 
method by canonical statistical means. The problem consists in fact that by “calculating 
an importance of a symbol X within the corpus created by linguistic community A” and 
by subsequent comparison of importances of X within the scopes of B,C,D,etc. we 
propose an unprecedent metrics for cultural comparison, i.e. we mathematically measure 
the objects which were never before measured – cultures. 
 
Wiki  
corpus 
Top country L Wiki  
corpus 
Top country L Wiki corpus Top country L 
AR ر (Egypt 17 FR France (France)  23 RO România (Romania) 7 
BG България (Bulgarria) 4 HE ישראל (Israel) 7 RU Германия (Germany) 3 
CS Česko (Czech  
 Republic) 
6 HR Hrvatska (Croatia) 4 SK Slovensko (Slovakia) 9 
DA Danmark (Denmark) 34 HU Magyarország (Hungary) 18 SL Slovenija (Slovenia) 8 
DE Deutschland (Germany) 16 LV Latvija (Latvia) 6 SR Француска (France) 28 
EL Ελλάδα (Greece) 7 NL Frankrijk (France) 11 SV USA 35 
ES España (Spain) 9 NO Norge (Norway) 6 TR Türkiye (Turkey) 13 
ET Eesti (Estonia) 5 PL Polska (Poland) 12 UK Україна (Ukraine) 13 
FI Suomi (Finland) 5 PT Brasil (Brazil) 10 ZH 印度尼西亚(Indonesia) 10 
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Table 3: country names found at the top of their intracultural lists (i.e. having lowest langrank L 
) 
 
Keywords: PageRank, Wikipedia, graph theory, comparative culturology, quantitative 
anthropology, cultural stylometry, world-corpus correlations 
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Narrative abilities are an integral part of pragmatic skills, the ability to use language, 
and they serve as a foundation of discourse abilities and learning at school. To be able to 
understand and tell a story, a child needs to have cognitive abilities (perceptual, memory 
and reasoning abilities), something to tell about (experiences, information and 
imagination) and linguistic means (words, grammatical structures) to express 
him/herself. To understand and tell stories, a child also has to have social, emotional 
and empathic abilities as he/she needs to grasp the motivation and actions of the 
characters in the stories and to tell the story in such a way that the receiver is able to 
access the intended meanings. With the help of developing cognitive abilities, a child 
begins to organize content (relations between goals, actions, and outcomes) and 
structure of a story, both in terms of a coherent whole and local structure of single 
events. Narratives are valuable tools in research as they provide us a window into a 
child’s mind.  
 Of pragmatic theories, Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995) provides a 
cognitive approach to communication and as such brings a way of exploring a child’s 
communicative potential. Relevance Theory enables one to explore processing that 
underlies language production in context. It enables one to explain how the hearer 
interprets speaker’s meaning on the basis of contextual factors. We used Relevance 
Theory to explore child’s cognitive processing during a story generation task in 73 
typically developing Finnish children aged two to 12 years. The children were asked to 
tell a story on the basis of a 4-picture series. The narratives collected at quiet facilities in 
the children’s homes, day-care centres or an after school club were audio and video-
recorded. Altogether 198 narratives were transcribed and analysed using a framework 
developed on the basis of Relevance Theory; analyses comprised 15 sub-categories 
representing descriptive expressions, evaluative comments and expressions requiring 
inferencing.  
 Children used a number of ideas representing picture description in a similar manner 
across the different age groups. The narratives of the older children were generally 
much longer than those of the younger age groups. Actions and ideas irrelevant to the 
story, (i.e., events irrelevant to the story depicted in the pictures), practically vanished 
after the age of five. From the age of three years onwards, the children referred 
increasingly to emotions and cognitive states of the characters in picture series. This 
finding is in accordance with the general knowledge on how theory of mind skills 
develop in children. From age seven onwards, many children started to use hedges, 
indicating narrator uncertainty and, thus, showing an ability to see multiple possible 
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interpretations or perspectives of an event. With age there was a growing use of 
reference assignment; personal or demonstrative pronouns referring to characters, 
objects or places seen in the pictures. Most importantly, the children showed a growing 
use of inferencing and world knowledge to produce implicature utterances with which 
they expressed something beyond what was seen from the pictures only.  
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Gestures are far more than random hand movements or a hangover from our 
evolutionary past, even though spoken language has most seemingly evolved from 
manual gestures. In the pre-school years children are limited in linguistic, metalinguistic 
and articulatory skills. Yet young children’s speech is accompanied by both iconic 
(representational) and deictic (pointing) gestures, with the prominence of each changing 
at different stages of development. Gestures serve many functions, both in a linguistic 
and in a cognitive domain. The Lexical Retrieval Hypothesis states that gestures 
facilitate access to words in the mental lexicon, and this may explain why they are 
ubiquitous when young children are acquiring language.  
 We studied gesture production of British (N = 80) and Finnish (N = 41) typically 
developing two- to five-year-old children in a video-recorded picture naming task. Our 
aim was to examine naming accuracy and cross-cultural differences in gesture use as a 
function of linguistic development. Additionally, we were interested in whether the 
frequency of deictic and iconic gestures changes with increasing age and linguistic 
competence, and if the co-speech gestures appear before the spoken word, thus 
providing lexical access facilitation in British and Finnish children. We also wanted to 
know if there is a difference between the numbers of gestures elicited for words with 
different types of semantic representation, and compared praxic and non-praxic words.  
 We analysed accuracy of naming, total number of gestures produced, modality of 
response (speech, speech and gesture, gesture), type of gesture (deictic, iconic), timing 
of gesture (before, at the same time, after speech), and (in British children only) 
frequency of gesturing as a function of type of stimulus word (praxic, non-praxic).  
 The naming responses of both the British and the Finnish 2-year-olds differed from 
the other three age groups in the following ways: 1) they produced significantly more 
gestures; 2) gave more bimodal speech and gesture responses and fewer speech only 
responses; and 3) were more likely to gesture before speech. These differences were 
more pronounced among the British children because they used more gestures than their 
Finnish counterparts. Additionally, the British 2-year-olds produced more deictic than 
iconic gestures than other children, and the British 3- and 5-year-olds gestured 
significantly more while naming praxic than non-praxic words. One overall difference 
between the British and Finnish children in all age groups was that the British children 
gestured more than the Finnish children. However, this difference was statistically 
significant only for the two-year olds.  
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 Our analyses captured developmental changes in gesture productions seldom studied 
in this age range and illuminate our understanding of the relationship between gesture 
and speech in the early years. Possible reasons for cross-cultural differences are 
discussed. 
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Inari Saami is an indigenous, endangered language spoken in northern Finland. During 
the presentation it is demonstrated by numerous examples that the Inari Saami idioms 
systematically reflect the conceptual metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999) TIME IS 
NATURE. In other words the Inari Saami people frequently refer to certain moments or 
periods of time by mentioning what happens in the nature at that time. This metaphor 
systematically recurs throughout the research material specified below. The ubiquitous 
English metaphor TIME IS MONEY, on the other hand, is claimed to be extremely rare 
in Inari Saami. This claim is based on the evidence provided by an idiom dictionary 
compiled by the author with an Inari Saami colleague (Idström & Morottaja 2006), 
1,300 pages of dictionary (Itkonen 1986–1989) and a few minor sources (e.g. Koskimies 
& Itkonen 1917, Itkonen 1992). The cultural background that explains these findings is 
discussed in the framework of Edward Hall’s (1983) theory of time concepts by 
comparing the language with features of the Inari Saami material and social culture. The 
traditional Inari Saami culture was polychronic: the timing of human action was based 
on observations in the natural environment and spontaneous reactions to these 
observations rather than on preset schedules. This time concept results from the 
prerequisites of human adaptation to the harsh natural conditions of Lapland, where 
fishing, hunting and reindeer husbandry were the main sources of livelihood. The 
language reflects the culture. It is emphasized that the idioms of endangered, indigenous 
languages should be urgently and exhaustively documented.  
 
Keywords: Inari Saami, idiom, conceptual metaphor/metonymy, time concept, 
endangered 
language 
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Evolutionary theorists (especially Robin Dunbar) argue that the everyday activity of 
gossip has played an important role in the evolution of human cooperation by spreading 
information about those who violate social norms, thus helping to maintain systems of 
indirect reciprocity. But as David Sloan Wilson points out, a distinction needs to be 
drawn between such group-serving gossip, which spreads useful information, and self-
serving gossip, which is used by individuals to damage rivals’ reputations and enhance 
their own. This distinction is reminiscent of the two sides of a debate in the late 1960s 
between the anthropologists Max Gluckman and Robert Paine, on whether gossip has a 
social function, which helped to generate an extensive ethnographic literature on gossip. 
Hence, there is the potential for analysing the ethnographic literature to look for cross-
cultural variations in patterns of gossip, in the hope of shedding light on its evolutionary 
functions. The current study describes the use of the Human Relations Area Files 
(HRAF) to analyse the content and frequency of gossip in various societies, and to 
investigate whether its use for self-serving ends is always derogated. HRAF is a 
constantly growing archive of ethnographic texts which is available online (see 
http://www.yale.edu/hraf/) and contains information about all aspects of life in 165 
cultures across the World. Each paragraph in the ethnographies within HRAF is indexed 
with specific subject codes, making it possible to conduct structured searches for 
various combinations of topics. A range of searches were conducted for this study, but 
the one that returned the most hits was the conjunction of conversation with social 
control. This search was then conducted across the Probability Sample File (a stratified 
random sample of 60 cultures within HRAF that meet certain criteria for ethnographic 
adequacy) and the results for each matching culture investigated in depth. Certain 
common themes of gossip emerged, including the violation of norms of sharing, gift-
giving or reciprocity; illicit sexual behaviour; and witchcraft practices. Although 
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widespread, use of gossip for social control appears more prevalent in certain regions 
and cultures than others, being heavily represented in European and (native) North 
American ethnographies, but sparsely represented in African ethnographies. In terms of 
the normativity of gossip itself, societies are split between those in which any form of 
negative gossip is proscribed (mostly in Africa and Central America) and those in which 
gossip is only seen as wrong when practised to excess. A developmental systems model 
is proposed in which general tendencies to gossip about violations in certain morally 
ambiguous but affectively stimulating domains (especially reciprocity, sex and 
witchcraft) are refined by cultural standards concerning the precise content of social 
norms in these areas and the acceptability of gossip itself. Future work is planned on 
what might be causing cross-cultural differences in gossip frequency, and on the 
relationship between gossip and shame: Although gossip sometimes leads to ostracism, 
it rarely leads to direct punishment, and most cultures seem to rely on people‘s sense of 
shame at the idea of being gossiped about to punish norm violators.   
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In the heyday of generativism, it was customary to claim that linguistic theory must be 
deductive and not inductive. This was an unfortunate formulation. There can be no 
linguistic theory that is not inductive at all. What was really meant by “deductive 
theory” was a (“universal”) theory whose inductive basis was incongruously limited to a 
single language, i.e. English (cf. Bach 2004). Thus, surprisingly, a weakness (= lack of 
data) was made to appear as a strength (= high degree of sophistication).  
 Generativism has increased its data base since then, but it still postulates a set of 
innate universal (or cross-linguistic) categories which are independent of particular 
languages. As against the generativist view, it has been argued by functionalists like 
Dryer (1997), Croft (2001), and Haspelmath (2008) that, in conformity with the 
structuralist où tout se tient principle, there are no genuine linguistic categories apart 
from language-particular (= “descriptive”) ones. On (this variant of) the functionalist 
view, any cross-linguistic (= “comparative”) categories (or “concepts”) are just useful 
fictions invented by the linguist. They are claimed to be totally different from 
descriptive categories and, in particular, to possess no psychological reality.  
 A third alternative will be presented here. First, the generativist view is rejected out 
of hand. Second, it is pointed out that if the functionalist view is accepted, it denies the 
possibility of genuine induction in typological linguistics, which is taken to be a 
reductio ad absurdum of this view.  
 Let us explain. Any typological theory results from generalizations about particular 
languages L1, L2, L3, etc. Such generalizations are bound to abstract away any 
idiosyncratic features of L1, L2,L3 etc, and they are — at least prima facie — of 
inductive nature. Simplistically speaking, particular languages exist in the heads of their 
respective speakers (but not only in their heads; cf. Zlatev et al. 2008). By contrast, 
since it is only the linguist who makes the (non-idiosyncratic) generalizations, their 
results, i.e. the cross-linguistic categories, do not exist in the speakers‘ heads, which 
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means that they, as such, are not psychologically real. However, if they are indeed 
conclusions of genuinely inductive inferences about L1, L2, L3 etc, then they must 
contain something which, while existing separately in L1, L2, L3, etc, is also common 
to L1, L2, L3, etc; and it is this common element that may plausibly be claimed to be 
psychologically real. To put it differently, cross-linguistic categories (like ‘noun’ and 
‘verb’) express similarities between L1, L2, L3 etc. which, of course, are not known by 
speakers of, e.g., L1. But if the similarities are genuine ones, they must have a basis in 
L1, L2, L3 etc, and in each case it is this basis which is psychologically real. Claiming 
cross-linguistic categories to be fictions amounts to claiming that there are no genuine 
similarities between the world’s languages, — a conclusion that should give pause to 
any serious-minded typologist.  
 When the abstractive/inductive process is spelled out, it turns out to exploit the 
“hermeneutic circle” in a twofold sense: first, between the categories and constructions 
(like ‘verb’ and ‘declarative sentence’) of a single language and, second, between 
particular languages and the cross-linguistic theory. Thus, in an unending “dialectical” 
movement, one “ascends” from data to theory and then “descends” from theory to data; 
and so on (cf. Itkonen 2006). Because of the gradual or “accretive” nature of the 
hermeneutic circle, its result (= cross-linguistic categories) could not possibly be 
“totally different” from its starting point (= descriptive categories), contrary to 
Haspelmath (2008). Since the hermeneutic circle is a “virtuous” one, the 
interdefinability of lexical categories and syntactic constructions involves no vicious 
circularity, contrary to Croft (2001).  
 This is the ‘third alternativeä presented in outline. In order to convert even the die-
hard supporters of the other two alternatives, a few refinements may need to be added:  
 i) The accumulated inductive knowledge takes the form of a general framework 
within which each phenomenon is supposed to find its proper place, rather than of a set 
of universal or statistical implications. 
 ii) The distinction between genuine and non-genuine similarities (between 
languages) is really the distinction between good and bad analogies (cf. Itkonen 2005).  
 iii) Categories may be exemplified to a higher or lower degree by various languages, 
which agrees with Givón’s (2001) “prototype approach”.  
 iv) Categories (like ‘subject’ vs. ‘object’) may be non-existent in some languages, 
which means that they may be psychologically real in many (or most) languages, but not 
in all languages. Consider the “comparative” definition of adjective proposed by 
Haspelmath (2008): “An adjective is a lexeme that denotes a descriptive property and 
can be used to modify a noun.” While this definition does not of course exhaust the 
import of ‘adjective-in-English’ or ‘adjective-in-Finnish’, it is almost certainly 
psychologically real in English and Finnish, as far as it goes. On the other hand, many 
languages have no category of adjective. Indeed, even psychological reality limited to 
e.g. 10 (perhaps closely related) languages would still be worthy of its name.  
 v) As a corollary of what precedes, the “descriptive vs. comparative” dichotomy 
turns out to result from an antiquated adherence to a discrete (= all-or-none) way of 
thinking, or from an inability to endorse the continuum metaphysics (in spite of frequent 
“official” claims to the contrary). Itkonen & Pajunen (2008) note several instances of 
the same discrete attitude.  
 vi) The “descriptive vs. comparative” dichotomy is claimed to herald a return to the 
early structuralist or Boasian view that each language should be described strictly on its 
own terms. But such an interpretation is not historically accurate: “The occurrence of 
the most fundamental grammatical concepts in all languages must be considered as 
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proof of the unity of fundamental psychological processes” (Boas 1964 [1911]: 21; 
emphasis added).  
 vii) There still remains the problem of explaining the (“non-comparative”) cross-
linguistic categories (because they in themselves do not of course explain anything.). In 
principle, it is possible to propose different mechanisms producing, or “pathways” 
leading to, various categories and constructions. In practice, only such are accepted as 
can be recapitulated by the typologist making use of his/her own capacity of empathy 
(even if admitting this plain fact goes counter to our Darwinist Zeitgeist; cf. Itkonen 
1999, 2004).  
 viii) We now see that, due to the intrinsic nature of language, results of empathy 
may have general significance, in spite of the fact that in traditional discussions 
empathy (= “re-enactment”, Einfühlung) was connected with (“ideographic”) 
explanation of single events and contrasted with (“nomothetic”) explanation by general 
laws.  
 ix) When fully explicated, empathy turns out to be identical with rational 
explanation, as defined in Itkonen (1983).  
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Innumerable scenarios exist for the evolution of language, and direct empirical data on 
language origins are scarce. But the plausibility of many scenarios can still be estimated 
from general principles and indirect data. Some principles apply to any unique 
evolutionary transition (cf. Poole & Penny 2006):  
 ▪ Parsimony implies that the transition likely took place along the stem lineage, 
between the last common ancestor (LCA) with an outgroup, and the LCA of the crown 
group.  
 ▪ Biological processes that demonstrably occur today are preferable to unique causes 
(cf. Lyell 1830).  
 ▪ Is the scenario congruent with phylogenetic and fossil data?  
 ▪ Would the postulated selective pressures actually lead towards the right end result 
(Johansson et al 2006)?  
 ▪ The “chimp test”: are the postulated selective pressures absent in relatives that 
didn’t make the transition (Bickerton 2002, Johansson 2005)?  
Some constraints are more language-specific:  
 ▪ The actual end result of language evolution (modern language) is imperfectly 
known. Is the postulated end result plausibly evolvable (Kinsella 2009, Johansson 
2009)?  
 ▪ Language evolved in a cultural context – is the scenario congruent with what is 
known, archeologically and otherwise, of the parallel evolution of culture and mind?  
 ▪ Language is an evolving cultural entity in its own right – is the coevolution of 
language and language capacity taken into account (Johansson 2005, 2009)?  
 ▪ Is the implied organisation of language congruent with neurological data (Kyriacou 
& Johansson, in press)?  
 ▪ Is the ontogeny of language and the human mind taken into account?  
 ▪ Do postulated intermediate steps and stages make linguistic sense (Stade 2009)?  
 ▪ Can the scenario be simulated? With what results?  
This list of points will be used as a reality check for a number of scenarios of language 
evolution. Among the scenarios to be evaluated are Locke & Bogin (2006), Bickerton 
(2009), Mithen (2006), and Zlatev et al (2005).  
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Hearing children of deaf parents (CODA) have the possibility to simultaneously acquire 
two languages that represent two different modalities: sign language based on visual 
modality and spoken language based on auditory modality. This bimodal and bilingual 
language acquisition setting provides a unique platform for both child language research 
and research exploring effective simultaneous use of words, signs and gestures. Namely, 
CODA children can use gestures, words and signs in a more diverse way than other 
children, since they acquire linguistic symbols in both manual and vocal modes. The 
first reports on sign-speech bilingualism were published in the 1970s. However, 
relatively little is known about bimodal bilingualism, even though this research area is 
able to reveal interesting aspects of a child’s developmental potential, and applications 
of such research include communication therapy procedures for children with, e.g. a 
specific language impairment.  
 The aim of the present study was to find out how hearing children of deaf parents 
communicate with deaf and hearing interlocutors and how they are ably to modify their 
language use as a function of their interlocutor's communication mode. Additionally, the 
aim was to describe the process of early bilingual and bimodal language development.  
 The language development of six CODA children was studied at the ages of 12 and 
18 months. At both data points, three different play sessions using a pre-selected set of 
books and toys were video recorded at home. The children first interacted with a deaf 
parent, then together with a deaf parent and a hearing researcher, and in the last session, 
with a hearing researcher. The communicatively best period of 15 minutes was 
transcribed from each of the three different play sessions with Elan software. These six 
children are also participating in a larger semi-longitudinal study that describes the 
language development of altogether 14 children of deaf parents at the age of one to five 
years. The parents were asked to report their child’s skills in both spoken language and 
sign language with the Finnish version of the MacArthur Communicative Development 
Inventories (MCDI).  
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 The MCDI showed that the six CODA children studied acquired the spoken 
language variably compared with their acquisition of Finnish Sign Language. Already at 
the age of 12 months, all the children preferred to use the same communication mode as 
their given interlocutor. Despite apparent differences in their spoken language skills, 
none of the children used any signs and all the children showed a clear preference for 
using the vocal mode when interacting with a hearing person. Concordantly, when 
communicating with a deaf parent, each child preferred to use the manual mode (signs 
and gestures) more often than vocal babbling or words. At the age of 18 months this 
distinction was even clearer.  
 The results of the present study indicate that already at an early age, children can be 
very flexible in their communication and sensitive to the language mode their 
interlocutor uses.  
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I. Consciousness and awareness Assuming that language faculty requires some form 
of consciousness, I would like to determine their mutual relationship. Consciousness as 
a mental phenomenon could be understood twofold: either as phenomenal 
consciousness (consciousness is the subjective quality of experience or qualia); or as 
psychological consciousness (awareness which is a state wherein we have access to 
some information and can use that information to control our behavior, e.g. 
introspection, reportability of mental states, access to self-model, knowledge). 
[Chalmers 1996] 
 I claim that explaining language faculty requires taking into consideration 
psychological consciousness. In fact, most of conscious aspects of language that Zlatev 
quotes (knowledge of meanings and rules, correctedness judgements, learning, et all.) 
[Zlatev 2008], are instances of awareness, not (phenomenal) consciousness. According 
to characteristic of awareness, so as to explain a phenomenon such as language learning, 
all we have to do is to explain various functional mechanisms giving rise to appriopriate 
changes in behavior in response to environmental stimulation. 
II. Cognitive modelling of language To pin down the above claim, I would like to 
investigate an example of the cognitve model of the language faculty (that I am 
implementing in the SNePS system) consisting of phonological, syntactic and 
semantic/conceptual modules and interfaces between them. I would like to analyze 
stages of natural language processing in such a system and point out hypothesized 
places and roles for psychological consciousness (such as: judging grammacity, 
choosing one of competing meanings, acquiring new meanings etc.) and suggest some 
possible solutions. 
 My second claim is that although explaining the language faculty requires taking 
into account only awareness, language is also inseparably connected with qualia. Taking 
the problem of “linguistic” qualia seriously, we should not ask about their role in 
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language, but we should ask why qualia accompany some (and what) aspects of 
language (and that's really the hard problem of consciousness [Chalmers 1996]). 
III. From mental to social I consider language as a mental phenomenon (in the sense 
presented in e.g. [Jackendoff 2007]). It is at odds with e.g. Zlatev's or Itkonen's claims 
concerning the primarily social nature of language. Talking about consciousness of 
external (non-mental) phenomena (e.g. norms), however, could be – at best – regarded 
as an intellectual shortcut: either I am aware of my mental representations of norms, or I 
use some different from standard notion of consciousness/awareness. I suggest, that we 
should begin with the notion of language as mental faculty and treat it as a base for 
language as a social phenomenon. 
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An important trait of the human species is that we can reason about the source of 
information we have for our beliefs. Languages encode source of information in various 
ways (Aikhenvald, 2004). Research on the acquisition of evidentiality enables us to find 
out how the developing conceptual and linguistic representations are related. Recent 
studies have found that children acquire linguistic evidentiality markers late, although 
children are able to monitor sources of knowledge much earlier (cf. Papafragou et al., 
2007). Moreover, within the class of evidentials, there are differences in when the 
individual markers are acquired. Evidentials that indicate direct evidence are acquired 
before evidentials that indicate indirect evidence (Papafragou et al., 2007). 
 This hierarchy in acquisition has been found in languages that encode source of 
information grammatically. In Dutch, the source of information is expressed lexically. 
The fact that you have a report about some proposition is expressed by the use of the 
verb schijnen ‘seem’. The verb lijken ‘seem’ refers to direct, but unclear evidence. The 
current study seeks to investigate whether the same hierarchy in the acquisition of 
evidentials can be found in Dutch. Following the hierarchy, we predict that children 
acquire lijken (direct evidence) prior to schijnen (indirect evidence). 
 To study the acquisition of these two Dutch verbs, ninety-one children in the age 
range of 5;0- 9;0 were tested on their comprehension of schijnen and lijken. Half were 
tested on schijnen; the other half on lijken. The child was asked to decide whether a 
sentence orally presented by a hand-puppet matched a picture or not. We compared the 
percentage of children’s (correct) rejections of sentences containing schijnen or lijken 
(test-items) in the mismatch condition, (i.e. the condition in which the sentence did not 
match the picture), to the percentage of rejections of control-items in the mismatch 
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condition. Results show that both verbs are acquired late by children, confirming 
previous studies. Children up till age seven perform significantly poorer on sentences 
with lijken, than on control-sentences. Interestingly, children tested on schijnen perform 
significantly poorer on these than on control-sentences even at age eight. 
 The difference in timeline can be attributed to the difference in semantics between 
schijnen and lijken. Schijnen creates a bigger mapping problem (Snedeker and 
Gleitman, 2004) for the child than lijken, as schijnen refers to indirect evidence, being 
available only inside the speaker’s mind. In contrast, lijken is easier to map as the direct 
evidence it refers to is objectively available. This difference in the acquisition of the two 
Dutch lexically expressed evidential markers, thus follows the hierarchy as found for 
grammatical markers of evidentiality. 
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The primary aim of the proposed paper is to defend a Wittgensteinian account of 
language acquisition. Roughly, this account yields the following: Children are born with 
the capacities necessary for the acquisition of language, namely; primitive instincts (OC 
475, Z 391) and instinctive reactions (CE 420). These innate instincts are manipulable; 
by their very nature they enable the environment to shape the behaviour of the child. 
Thus, it is possible for competent language users to shape the behaviour of the child 
through training so that she or he can become language users (BB, p. 77, RPP I 151, cf. 
Z 545). The child's language learning process deals not only with direct learning but 
with indirect learning as well (OC 143). Through indirect learning the child learns 
"Grammatical hinges" (OC 476), "Grammatical connections" (PI 208, 224) and 
"Attitude towards the norm" (RFM VII. 61). These three types of indirect learning 
processes enable the child to learn more complex uses of language (OC 473, 476; Z 300, 
410). Moreover, the third type of indirect learning process enables the child's 
assimilation in a society of language users. This third type means that the child learns 
standards of correctness. These standards of correctness are the standards of the 
community; they are agreements that express our common 'form of life' (PI 240-241). 
Since the child learns these standards of correctness through the guidance of competent 
language users, these instructors serve as mediators between the child and society. 
 The defence of the proposed account of language acquisition confronts Fodor's and 
Chomsky's innate perspectives. Both Fodor and Chomsky believe that language 
acquisition is possible only if a child is born with capacities that already incorporate (at 
least crucial aspects of) language (Fodor, 1975, 56, 64; Chomsky, 1988, 28, 60). Both 
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Fodor's 'Language of Thought' and Chomsky's 'Language Faculty' embody innate 
syntactic structures and rules (transformation rules for Fodor, 'Universal Grammar' for 
Chomsky) and innate conceptual scheme. The crux of the problem with these innate 
perspectives lies in what Fodor refers to as 'narrow content' (1987, 48-53). In the course 
of this paper I would like to show that: (I) Narrow content is de facto what an "innate 
concept" is supposed to be when being manifested in one's mind qua innate (i.e., 
without external intentionality); (II) Chomsky is in part committed to Fodor's notion of 
'narrow content'; (III) The notion of 'narrow content' is unintelligible; (IV) The innate 
perspectives are conceptually incoherent. Having done so, an argument for the 
preferability of the Wittgensteinian account of language acquisition will be presented. 
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Pinker ( 2002) Culture is crucial, but culture could not exist without mental faculties 
that allow humans to create and learn culture to begin with. In most anthropological 
literature premised on witchcraft or sorcery in Sub-Saharan Africa cases in point being 
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Evans-Pritchard (1937) study on the Azande speakers in Sudan, Gottieb's (1989) 
research among the Beng community of Ivory Coast, Pascal Boyer's (2001) analysis of 
witchcraft beliefs among the Fang ethnic group in Cameroun, Fiona Bowie's (2004) 
insights on witchcraft and the evil eye in African societies, undeniably confirm the 
existence of an African obsession with witchcraft, in accounting for virtually any 
societal calamity starting from road accidents, illnesses, collapsed business ventures, 
societal tensions to massive deaths. One recurring fact constantly mentioned in the 
abovementioned texts is the perplexed reactions of most Westerners whenever they 
encounter the witchcraft-misfortune counter-intuitive line of argument in the African 
discourse. Epidemiologists have now been compelled to join anthropologists in trying to 
comprehend the witchcraft fascination erroneously serving as a reason for the 
propagation of even scientifically proven ailments such as AIDS and HIV, verbalized in 
statements such as AIDS is caused by invisible insects sent by sorcerers (cf Sabatier, 
1988). To demystify this cultural obsession, my paper is premised on two objectives; 
first and foremost to employ Dan Sperber's culture and modularity thesis in explaining 
the widespread reflective belief of AIDS IS WITCHCRAFT within African cultures. 
Secondly, using a metaphorical background, I would like to argue that scholars should 
not be quick in dismissing the irrationality of AIDS IS WITCHCRAFT metaphor. The 
reason being under the notion of metarepresentation or interpretive use of language, 
witchcraft particularly black magic possesses a negative charge that figuratively 
captures the harsh realities of HIV and AIDS from an African perspective. 
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This paper argues that asking 'how has language evolved?' is better reformulated as 'how 
have acts of speaking-through-symbols been constructed and elaborated?'1. Two central 
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consequences of this reformulation are that 'language', in fact, does not evolve, and even 
if it did, the Darwinian account of evolution is inadequate to account for its elaboration. 
A more adequate account of what has been subsumed in the phrase 'language evolution' 
is available in the conceptual framework of Jacob von Uexküll2 and its modern 
reincarnation in the paradigm of niche construction3. These conceptualisations relocate 
the locus of 'where the action is' away from the organism as the unit of selection to the 
relation of the organism to its environment, this relationship being instantiated in what 
von Uexküll termed the organism's Umwelt.  
 In von Uexküll's framework, organisms do not respond to casual events in the 
environment, but to perceptual signs or meanings4. This point is also there in the 
approach of Mead5. Any sign or meaning logically entails other meanings, and these 
other meanings constitute an epigenetic pathway that needs to be discovered. This 
discovery is made possible by symbols. Hence the questions of how symbols and 
symbol systems are a) established, and b) elaborated in use, come to the fore. There has 
been a great deal of work put in on the first of these questions, and with the recent 
discovery of mirror neuron systems in humans, the evolutionary questions with respect 
to human symbol capability can be broadly settled6. The second question has received 
less attention.  
 How might this second question be best formulated with respect to phylogeny? A 
clue is provided from the ontogenetic domain through the amount of mileage 
developmental psychologists have recently got from Vygotsky's elucidation of the 
'zoped' which is interactively worked-in by a more skilled practitioner in their dealings 
with a less skilled novitiate7. To get any traction on phylogenetic questions requires 
figuring out how zopeds might be constructed sui generis in the interactions between 
two equally unskilled novitiates. This can be done by drawing the ideas of Mead, 
Vygotsky, Gibson8, and von Uexküll into a nexus that underwrites the 'how' of the 
evolutionary elaboration of symbol systems.  
 The resulting framework for the elaboration of symbol systems is that Umwelts are 
a) logically pregnant with the possibilities of their future elaboration; b) in-formed, for 
humans, with a grasp of the intentionality of conspecifics; c) have symbols pre-
informing them; and d) the products of past activities inter-generationally conserved in 
them9. The final piece that prods possibility into actualisation is almost certainly the re-
organisation of social interaction that was a consequence of changes in the parameters 
of the spatial dimension of human life: firstly in the relinquishing of sedentary life with 
the initial migration out of Africa; secondly with the transfer of materials between 
separate groups; and thirdly in the re-adoption of sedentary life and house-dwelling with 
the growth of agriculture10.  
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Along with conversation, narrative is one of the leading candidates for a universal genre 
of language use. It is the site of at least two layers of intersubjectivity: that at which the 
narrator interacts with the narratee and that at which subjects within the narrative 
interact among themselves. In written narratives the first layer of intersubjectivity is 
transformed through the medium of writing into two virtual subjectivities – that of the 
writer with her imagined reader in an initial enunciative act and that of the reader with 
her imagined writer in a subsequent enunciative act displaced in time and space. In oral 
or signed narratives, this first layer of intersubjectivity is necessarily embodied in the 
face-to-face presence of the participants in the enunciative act. In oral languages, within 
this initial, embodied, physically grounded enunciative setting, the second layer of 
virtual narrative intersubjectivity is constructed through the medium of language. 
Through such linguistic devices as tense and modality, the narrator builds virtual spaces 
in which the narrative world is put onstage while backgrounding its rootedness in the 
current telling; and through linguistic embedding, voices are able to interact through the 
medium of other voices. In signed languages these functions of virtualizing the story 
space and narrative interaction are not performed only through verbal means, but also 
and principally by using the same physically present body in the same physical space in 
which the primary level of intersubjectivity is grounded and enacted. This paper will 
describe our research with Brazilian Sign Language narratives which focuses on how 
the mediation between the two layers of intersubjectivity is achieved in the gestural 
structuring of physical space by means of such analog media as postural shift, bodily 
tension, facial expression and eyegaze, building on gestural resources that are massively 
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available in the non-linguistic performance of coordinated activity. We will assume that 
notions such as embodiment, intersubjectivity, and grounding, as explored in the 
literature of fields as diverse as philosophy, psychology, sociology, anthropology, 
linguistics, and robotics, are complexly interrelated radial categories. Curiously, as 
almost primitively central as they are to the semiotic enterprise, they all appear to bear 
the marks of correction and re-direction: embodiment to correct a philosophy of 
desembodiment; intersubjectivity to remind us of the natural habitat of the subject; and 
grounding to re-root symbols and discourse in the meaningful life-world from which 
they had flown free. The study of signed language narratives engages us in a kind of 
home-coming, rediscovering the meaningful wholeness of our intrinsically embodied, 
intersubjective, grounded experience. 
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Performers in skilled movement domains like sport, yoga, and dance like to entrust 
grooved actions to the body, to the habitual routines of kinesthetic memory. But they 
also know that true, open-ended expertise requires thought and action to come together, 
cooperate instead of competing. How, under what circumstances, can embodied skills 
remain open to situational awareness and memory? How do we influence ourselves, in 
practice and in performance? What kind of intelligence is flexible and fine-grained 
enough to influence habits which have become second nature over years of intensive 
training? How can instruction ever alter grooved embodied skills? We report 
experience-near, multi-method case studies of two specific, culturally-embedded 
domains of expertise: yoga and cricket batting. We examine mechanisms by which 
experts can redeploy embodied skills by way of diverse ‘instructional nudges’, from 
teachers, in collaborative processes, and in self-influence, which sculpt and re-set action 
sequences over different timescales.  
 Practitioners claim that yoga enhances sensitivity to bodily experience and signature 
patterns of tension: we look for cues that most effectively achieve this. Such sensitivity 
makes habitual movement patterns available for renegotiation and optimal adjustment. 
We work with the Iyengar and Anusara traditions of yoga, which share a pose repertoire 
but employ very different teaching styles. Different modes of instruction affect the 
experience of changed access to kinesthetic cues. We observe and record how teachers 
facilitate students’ acquisition of movement sequences by demonstration, verbal 
instruction, and manual adjustment. Our talk includes examples of short filmed 
sequences of poses apt for instruction at different levels of expertise. To investigate the 
origin of new levels of movement precision and sensitivity to bodily cues, we show 
these sequences to expert and novice practitioners across the two traditions, with or 
without accompanying expert verbal instruction. Experts differ from novices not only in 
their capacity to perform more subtle movements, but also in their perception of bodies 
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in motion: verbal cues, tailored to level of expertise but often specific to a practice 
tradition, can enhance subtle movement production and its perception.  
 Secondly, we discuss the roles of common or idiosyncratic verbal tags and maxims 
in cricket batting, an example of an open skill under severe temporal constraints. 
Practitioners are schooled to ‘watch the ball’, for example, and use such self-
administered nudges – either verbal, or in the form of behavioural routines, gesture 
patterns, or thought/ image sequences – to re-orient their response repertoires. Such 
thoughts and sayings are not top-down instructions, reprogramming the body to the 
mind’s design: but neither are they wholly epiphenomenal, inevitably disrupting 
absorbed coping, as suggested in some influential theories of the phenomenology of 
expertise. By the notion of ‘applying intelligence to the reflexes’, we mean that 
apparently automated patterns of action are in skilled performance in fact already open 
to current contingency and past meanings. Experts somehow open their ‘reflexes’ up 
into acquired adaptive patterns, and construct through practice not a set array of clever 
moves, but dynamic repertoires of potential action sequences to be selectively accessed, 
redeployed, and transformed. 
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The longitudinal analysis of children’s linguistic productions can help us understand the 
complex process of language acquisition. But studying these productions in their 
dialogical context facilitates our apprehension of the linguistic, interactional and 
cognitive paths children follow to use linguistic forms in interaction. Among 
interactional sequences, repairs (Forrester, 2008; Schegloff et al., 1977) are probably 
one of the most accessible phenomena in which these dimensions can be captured 
(Bernicot et al., 2006).  
 In order to investigate the interdependence between the components at play in the 
course of children’s development, we study the evolution of repairs in mother-child 
interactions in two longitudinal follow-ups from the Paris Corpus (Morgenstern & 
Parisse, 2007) on the CHILDES database (MacWhinney, 2000). Both children (one boy 
and one girl) are studied between the age of 1;6 and 2;11, a period during which we 
observed important differences in their linguistic development. In addition, both 
children evolve in family environments with different conceptions of childhood. These 
linguistic and social differences are particularly interesting for the study of the 
 54 
relationship between the development of cognition, language and communication skills 
in interaction (Ochs 1984). Both other- and self-repairs are analysed, and coded 
according to their linguistic level (phonological, morphosyntactic, semantic, or 
pragmatic). We concentrate our analyses on the high correlation between children’s 
cognitive ability to reformulate their own utterances and the linguistic tools in terms of 
grammatical markers and constructions at their disposal.  
 Preliminary results from our quantitative and qualitative analyses first show that the 
total number of repairs suddenly increases at a particular point in time and then 
decreases as children get older. Other-repairs tend to decrease more importantly than 
self-repairs. In addition, the nature of self-repairs changes as they become more and 
more spontaneous and less and less elicited by the interlocutor. Children’s uptakes of 
other-repairs change as well: from simple repetitions of their own utterances to the 
assimilation of other-repairs. Children change their own productions according to the 
suggestions directly or indirectly made by their interlocutor. 
 In addition, the linguistic level of these repairs changes as the children grow up. 
Repairs on phonology decrease as repairs on morphosyntax and semantics increase. 
Pragmatic repairs appear at later stages. The comparison between the two children 
suggests that the author of the repair and the linguistic level targeted evolve according 
to two main factors: - the children’s actual linguistic, cognitive and social skills - the 
adults’ conception of the children’s competences. Self repairs and reformulations could 
be the result of a “grammaticalization” process in children’s language through 
internalization of social rules as well as adult grammar and constructions. 
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Three-year-olds generally have a limited understanding of other people’s mental states, 
especially if they are contrary to their own. At around 4,5, however, most children 
understand that others can believe things that they themselves do not. They have a 
“Theory of Mind” (ToM). The relationship between language and ToM is debated. Is 
language pivotal in the development of ToM? Or is ToM a prerequisite for the 
development of language (cf. Milligan et al. 2007)? 
 This paper presents research that considers this debate from a different angle. In this 
work, the developmental relationship between ToM, language and mental language is 
explored. Mental language refers to those areas of language that involve an 
understanding of others, as in mental state terms like definitely and maybe that refer to 
the level of speaker certainty. Mental language is an interesting area in this respect as it 
is on the interface of language and ToM. It is related to linguistic ability in that the 
mental state terms have to be acquired as words, but also to ToM as it requires the 
understanding of others’ minds to truly appreciate the intended meaning. In light of the 
ToM-language debate described above, it is an interesting question to ask whether ToM 
or language will contribute most to mental language. 
 This issue was investigated by giving 110 4-year-old Dutch children various ToM, 
language and mental language tests. ToM tests consisted of false belief tests (in which 
the behaviour of a story character with an outdated belief had to be predicted); language 
tests comprised vocabulary and syntax measures. Mental language was tested by 
considering children’s understanding of the Dutch equivalents of the modal auxiliaries 
must be and might be and the modal adjuncts definitely and maybe. 
 Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted with ToM and language as 
independent variables mental language as the dependent variable. The regression model 
was an adequate fit of the data (R²=18.9%; R²adj= 17.4%; F2,107=12.49, p _.00). 
Whereas language ability was not a significant predictor of pragmatic ability once ToM 
was controlled for (t107 = 1.38; p = .17), ToM did significantly predict performance on 
the mental language tests (t107 = 2.40; p = .02). 
 These findings suggest that it is not so much a child’s linguistic ability that 
contributes to her capacity to acquire the areas of mental language considered here, but 
her ability to understand another person’s mental states. This then poses a challenge to 
linguistic determinism accounts that hold that understanding others’ mental states is 
dependent on language. Furthermore, these findings go against a strictly modular view 
of language acquisition. For the acquisition of at least the areas of language studied 
here, children seem to rely not so much on their linguistic capacities, but more on 
abilities from another domain of cognition. This kind of interaction between different 
cognitive domains thus strongly suggests an interactive architecture of cognitive 
development. 
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Three-year-olds generally have a limited understanding of other people’s mental states, 
especially if they are contrary to their own. At around 4,5, however, most children 
understand that others can believe things that they themselves do not. They have a 
“Theory of Mind” (ToM). Autistic children, on the other hand, are generally found to be 
impaired in their ToM development (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Given the important 
role of understanding speaker intentions in language learning (cf. Bloom 2002), it is an 
interesting question to consider whether autistic children are capable of understanding 
language that relates to ToM development. This study aims to investigate this by 
considering autistic children’s understanding of the different levels of speaker certainty 
as conveyed by modal auxiliaries. 
 Nineteen Dutch-speaking TD children (M=6;5 years) and ten autistic children 
(M=6;11 years) participated in the study. Children received two ToM tasks in which 
they had to predict and explain the behaviour of a story character with an outdated 
belief. To control for differences in general verbal ability, participants also received two 
language tests assessing vocabulary and syntax. Children were tested on their 
understanding of the Dutch modal auxiliaries moet (must), zal (shall) and kan (might). 
The task involved a sticker being hidden in one of two boxes which children had to find 
by using clues given by two puppets. The puppets used the modal auxiliaries 
contrastively, e.g. “the sticker might be in the blue box” vs. “the sticker must be in the 
red box”. To find the sticker, the children had to favour moet over zal and kan and zal 
over kan. 
 The results showed that the autistic children did not differ significantly from the TD 
children on modal auxiliary understanding (t27=0.63; p=.53). A different result was 
obtained, however, when the subjects were divided in passing or failing the ToM tasks 
(with passing defined as answering all questions correctly). One autistic child and 14 
TD children passed the ToM tasks, whereas nine autistic children and five TD children 
did not. Results from this analysis showed that whereas these two groups did not differ 
significantly in general language ability (t27=0.03; p=.98) or in age (t27=0.26; p=.80), 
the ToM passers performed significantly better on modal auxiliary understanding than 
the ToM failers (t27=-3.48; p=.002). 
 ToM thus seems to be important in acquiring modal auxiliaries. In fact, passing or 
failing ToM tasks is a better predictor of modal auxiliary understanding than being 
autistic or TD. These findings thus suggest that having an underdeveloped ToM impairs 
the child in acquiring modal auxiliaries. If an autistic child is able to figure out the 
mental states of others, they also seem able to understand the differences in speaker 
certainty as conveyed by modal auxiliaries. Conversely, if the TD child has not yet 
developed full ToM, they have problems in understanding modal auxiliaries. 
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PACE & FIELD & CARVER  
 
Evidence for Convergence of Event Segmentation and Language Processing 
Amy Pace, Margaret Friend, and Leslie J. Carver 
San Diego State University and University of California, San Diego 
 
This paper investigates the integration of event segmentation and language processing. 
There is growing evidence suggesting a convergence in the processes that underlie the 
extraction of action components from continuous motion and the attribution of meaning 
to these actions. By 6-8 months, infants discriminate continuous action sequences that 
contain a familiar pattern from those that do not (Hespos, Saylor, & Grossman, 2009). 
By 10-12 months, infants are sensitive to segmental structure within familiar human 
action that coincides with perceptual cues and intentional boundaries (Baldwin, Baird, 
Saylor & Clark, 2001). Recent ERP evidence (Reid, et al., 2009) indicates that at 9 
months, event expectancy violations elicit a late-occurring N400-like component, 
suggesting that event processing may have a conceptual basis. This leads to interesting 
questions regarding the relation between perceptual and conceptual processes involved 
in mapping labels to actions. 
 In Study 1, 24-month-olds (N=26) were familiarized with a video of a novel, 3-
action event. Next, they viewed videos with pauses in the middle of each action 
(interrupting) or at the completion of each action (completing). There was a preference 
for the interrupting video measured by the longest sustained look, t(25) = 4.154, p < .05 
and proportion of looking time t(25) = 3.227, p < .05 (Figure 1). Thus, at 24-months, 
sensitivity to event structure extends to novel events. A stronger test is whether toddlers 
can select a single, embedded, action for re-enactment as they have excellent immediate 
recall for complex events (Bauer, 1999). In Study 2, 24-month-olds (N = 14) viewed the 
action sequence from Study 1 and were prompted to re-enact a single action. Seventy-
nine percent of toddlers re-enacted one and only one action when prompted providing 
evidence that they recognize disruptions of event structure and also spontaneously 
segment novel events at action boundaries. In Study 3 (in progress), ERP data are being 
collected to identify the components associated with action processing and verb learning 
by comparing responses to named versus unnamed actions. Data are recorded as 
participants view the completing and interrupting event sequences from Study 1. 
Preliminary findings for unnamed actions suggest that children respond differentially to 
interrupting and completing events. Specifically, interrupted events yield an early, 
perceptual component (N100) and a later-occurring, conceptual component (N400), 
suggesting that the mechanisms of semantic integration are triggered by nonlinguistic 
motion events. Contrasting these findings with data from named actions will help to 
clarify whether language learning amplifies existing conceptual distinctions between 
actions or whether labeling engenders conceptual processing. Together, these data 
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elucidate the functional connection between action perception, event representation, and 
semantic processes. 
 
Figure 1. 
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Coherence and persistence of conceptual metaphors in Beaver (Athabascan) 
Carolina Pasamonik (Ph.D. student) 
University of Cologne 
carolina.pasamonik@uni-koeln.de 
 
Figurative language and especially metaphors are exposed to intensive (socio)linguistic 
investigations, often concerning their cognitive and conceptual properties (Kristiansen et al. 
2006). The 'contemporary theory of metaphor' identified a wide range of underlying 
conceptualizations manifested in non-literal language, especially for abstract content like 
emotion or time which are claimed to be neither thinkable nor pronounceable without any 
metaphorical mappings to concrete concepts (Lakoff 1993). The theory is based on English 
spoken by the author himself, and introspection was employed as an important tool. 
 The present study tries to apply this theory to a less described language not spoken by 
the researcher. It aims at exploring language intuition and awareness of native speakers 
concerning conceptual and linguistic metaphors, as opposed to mere introspection on the 
researcher's side. Furthermore, the influential status of English as the dominant language 
and as means of communication for speakers and researchers is investigated against the 
background of the accessibility of Beaver conceptual metaphors and cultural models 
(Holland & Quinn 1987). 
 The study is based on the Beaver (Athabascan) language spoken in Canada. The 
consultants are bilingual, besides Beaver as their first language they also speak English. 
 Access to literal meanings of figurative expressions depends on aspects concerning 
lexicalization and conventionalization, and the degree of transparency of the relationship 
between literal and metaphorical meanings (Recanati 2004). In metalinguistic discussions 
speakers uniformly realize the discrepancy between what is said and what is meant or 
communicated in figurative expressions, like in the Beaver idiom sadze e ʼ tyi hsane “I 
am lonely (lit. my heart is poor/pitiful)”. This form is described as having a figurative 
meaning departed from the literal meaning, and speakers are able to give explanations of 
the literal meaning. On the other hand, it seems more problematic to access its relations to 
the metaphorical meaning, indicating that conscious availability of the systematic 
embeddedness of source concepts in the lexicon, as well as of the underlying 
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conceptualizations of corresponding mappings, is restricted. Here, careful analysis of the 
lexicon structures allows for insight into semantic networks relating body parts like 
HEART to concepts of anger, courage or loneliness. Furthermore, this context enables 
investigation of cultural models giving rise to culture-specific body part metaphors. 
Notwithstanding conscious restrictions, these culturally based correspondences between 
specific body parts and specific emotions or traits are sustained against differing English 
mappings, suggesting high significance of the concepts despite their inaccessibility to 
speakers' awareness. 
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Does language reflect the way the Baka community classifies animals? 
Pascale Paulin 
DDL Laboratory, Institut des Sciences de l’Homme, Lyon, FRANCE 
Pascale.Paulin@ish-lyon.cnrs.fr 
 
The Baka are a minority group of hunter-gatherers in North Gabon, totalling less than 
500 individuals. They still attest a semi-nomadic lifestyle and find all they need for their 
survival in the surrounding forest by hunting, fishing and gathering. The way the Baka 
community classifies animals can be most efficiently expressed through a multi-
dimensional, non-treelike representation, with different criteria coexisting at the same 
level and no hierarchical relationship between the various dimensions. The most crucial 
issue is that certain categories are not named (i.e. covert categories). The multi-
dimensional approach has enabled us to isolate these categories. It is therefore essential 
to make a clear distinction between “identification” (perception), “naming” (denotation) 
and “classification”. 
 While performing the task of classifying mammals, the Baka call kémà (which can 
be roughly rendered by ‘monkey’) different kinds of monkeys such as ŋgítì 
(Miopithecus ogoouensis), kàlū (Colobus guereza occidentalis), gbèsúmá 
(Cercopithecus pogonias), etc. Close to this grouping, they distinguish another category, 
viz. monkeys without tail (roughly equivalent to our category of apes). The latter, which 
is composed of primates such as the gorilla and the chimpanzee, for example, is not 
explicitly named. Bahuchet (1989: 225) corroborates the existence of covert categories 
in Baka: “The linguistic structure of Aka and Baka plant and animal names does not 
reflect taxonomy, and therefore the latter is to be brought to light by other means”.  
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 Moreover, semantic fields shift over time, and reconstructions, whenever available 
for a group of languages, cannot easily be used for the study of categorization as the 
reconstructed meanings often lack precision or may have evolved. E.g. The Baka word 
“só” is usually translated as ‘meat’ and/or ‘game’, but it can also be used to denote the 
category of all “animals being eaten by man”.  
 Therefore, societies should be studied in a dynamic and situated (i.e. ecological) 
perspective. Static approaches, which do not take into account context, situation and 
change yield skewed results. Folk categories often group entities belonging a priori to 
very different semantic fields and therefore may seem surprisingly heterogeneous to 
anyone unfamiliar with the culture. E.g. Although speaking about animals, Baka may 
come up with a category composed of the bee [tòŋgìa], honey [фókì] and the honey 
basket [pεndī]. As all other world views, the Baka cosmogony has created a coherent 
universe where all bits and pieces are closely linked together, and context related. For 
this reason, the way Baka classify animals cannot be accounted for by using one unique 
dimension only. 
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The Epistemic Modalities of Literary Criticism 
David B. Paxman 
Brigham Young University (USA) 
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In textworld theory, the term “epistemic modalities” refers to words and phrases that 
signal degrees and kinds of knowledge claims within a text. Although a study of 
epistemic modalities offers a reduced version of the epistemology of discourse, it gives 
salience to the verbal epistemological signals—the absolute, qualified, conditional, and 
hypothetical claims to knowledge made in a text; it thus has the advantage of being 
more visible and therefore more openly confirmed or dis-confirmed. 
 This paper has two purposes, first, to test the usefulness of epistemic modalities as a 
window into the epistemology of a specialized discourse such as literary criticism, and 
second, to present a cognitive model of the knowledge claims typical in that discourse, 
starting with epistemic modalities and building outward to less overt ways of stating 
knowledge claims. To accomplish these tasks the paper will use as a sample ten recent 
essays of literary criticism that address different genres and historical eras and are 
informed by different theoretical commitments. It will argue that while epistemic 
modalities do not give a full picture of the knowledge claims in literary criticism, they 
do draw attention to other, less overt, claims that can be accessed through other 
cognitive processes such as mental models and blending. The paper offers and supports 
a hypothesis: that much literary criticism is conducted by means of an explicit or 
implicit hypothetical reasoning: if we assume W, if we define X (be it a genre, a 
historical concept, an ideology, etc.) in such and such a way, and if Y context holds true, 
we may conclude Z.  
 The paper will conclude with a diagram of the main features of knowledge claims in 
literary criticism incorporating four cognitive processes: categories as defined in 
cognitive study, epistemic modalities, mental models (to use Johnson-Laird’s term), and 
blending.  
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Testing pictorial competence in great apes 
Tomas Persson 
Centre for Cognitive Semiotics. Lund, Sweden.  
tomas.persson@lucs.lu.se 
 
Pictures are common in the experimental study of animal cognition, and have been 
successfully used in perceptual as well as conceptual tasks for decades. The principal 
concern has been whether animals are able to recognize objects in pictures or not. The 
answer is positive (e.g. Fagot et al. 1999; Bovet & Vauclair, 2000). However, the issue 
whether animals are able to regard pictures as pictures is vastly understudied. This 
question is relevant in light of the scientific interest in the use of other semiotic 
resources in great apes, such as language and gesture, which also rest on the ability to 
read meanings into expressions differentiated from their referents. Can animals view 
pictures in this way, as signs?  
 I propose that there are at least three ways in which a picture can be successfully 
used in a discrimination or matching procedure (Persson, 2008). The first way, surface 
mode, is by discriminating only surface features (shapes, colors etc.) of the picture. By 
responding to invariant features in a set of pictures, successful performance is possible 
without recognition of a motif. Surface mode thus bypasses an appreciation of 
categorical similarity between entities. The second way, reality mode, is to apprehend a 
motif but not sufficiently differentiate this from reality. In this mode e.g. sorting, 
matching and communicating with the help of pictures is possible, but it is not really 
different from relating real instances of the depicted objects. Reality mode thus bypasses 
reference. The third alternative, pictorial mode, is to see pictures as pictures. True 
pictorial competence is here defined as the approach to stimuli as being visually similar 
to, but differentiated from, real-world entities. With such an approach it is possible to 
decode pictures that deviate (visually or otherwise) from reality to a larger extent than in 
reality mode, although the latter can be quite stretchable.  
 In order to study pictorial competence in animals one must therefore control for 
performance in surface- and reality modes. Animals should ideally be able to perform 
with novel depictions that are low in realism, or pictures that otherwise violate 
processing in reality mode. Typical for these types of pictures is that their similarities to 
referents often need to be "filled in" by the perceiver. They are thus also a promising 
avenue for studying imagination in animals.  
 Issues with testing pictorial competence will be presented from work with gorillas at 
Givskud Zoo, Denmark and language trained bonobos at Great Ape Trust of Iowa, 
USA. Results suggest that some great apes are able to perform in a pictorial mode. 
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How language and biology contribute to mental color representations 
Alessio Plebe 
Department of Cognitive Science, Messina, Italy 
alessio.plebe@unime.it 
 
An important question concerning color perception in humans is how lexical items 
related to colors interact with the biology of the visual system in building color concepts 
(Davidoff, 2001; Kowalski & Zimiles, 2006). The domain of color terms has 
traditionally been a privileged terrain of debate in the universalism/relativism issue, 
being a conceptually well circumscribed domain, without neat boundaries in it from a 
physical point of view. In the hope of shedding additional light on this debate, we 
propose a computational model of the convergence between visual and linguistic 
processing paths in the cortex, aimed at exploring the emergence of color concepts in 
the early human development. This model is a system of artificial cortical maps, close 
enough to the biological organization of the cortex in general, and specifically of the 
visual system (Miikkulainen, Bednar, Choe, & Sirosh, 2005; Plebe & Domenella, 
2006). It consists of two main paths, one for the visual process and another for the 
auditory channel, which convey to a higher amodal map. All the functional organization 
in the cortical maps emerge from the known hierarchy of structures, and their exposure 
to several sets of environmental stimuli. The aim is to trace in brain mechanisms where 
the genetic endowment for color processing and the functional plasticity resulting from 
cultural and environmental exposure meet. Three different versions of the model are 
specialized through exposure to color terms of three different languages, while looking 
at objects colored accordingly to the heard word. One language is English, the other two 
are Berinmo, from New Guinea, and Himba, from Namibia, languages with singular 
properties, as been reported by recent research (Roberson, Davidoff, Davies, & Shapiro, 
2005). The pre-linguistic exposure to natural scenes are specialized too, according to the 
different spectra of the environment of the three investigated societies. While in most 
modern countries early exposure to colors is too varied and unspecific to trigger stable 
modifications, environments like New Guinea and Namibia seem enough peculiar in 
color spectra to affect the early emergence of color processing functions in the brain. 
This environmental bias will later merge with the categorical effects of the lexical color 
terms. 
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HOME in Poetry: Conceptual and Cultural Dimensions  
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The notion of concept is one of the central in cognitive linguistics. The paper focuses on 
defining, modeling, and describing the concept content viewed as the model of its semantic 
space in ten thousand pages of American poetry of the 20th century.  
The main goal of this paper is to study the content of the HOME concept in terms of 
cognitive, cultural, and axiological approaches in modern linguistics. The presentation has 
two-fold objective: 1) to analyze the meanings of home in a wide variety of dictionaries and 
the fundamental works related to home in traditional sciences: philosophy, psychology, etc.; 
2) to elucidate, via a set of techniques used in poetic text close reading, the meanings of 
home that are there to trigger and guide the readers’ interpretative effort. The semantic, 
conceptual, and linguostylistic analyses are used with the elements of text interpretation.  
In the report the HOME concept is viewed as the set of general human and culture-
specific meanings that reflect home as a certain objective, social, and cultural phenomenon. 
The meaning is a particular quantum of information connected with world-oriented and 
speaker-oriented notions related to home.  
The novelty of the research lies in viewing the concept content as its semantic space. 
The conception of the semantic space modelling of the HOME concept as objectified in the 
form of verbal poetic images of home in American poetry of the 20th century has been 
worked out and applied.  
Hence, the report suggests that the semantic space of the HOME concept is the set of 
meanings arranged in one multilevel structure (model) based on two principles: 1) semantic 
similarity which results in the formation of a particular semantic axis, and 2) semantic 
differences which determine the opposite ends of the axis and the arrangement of each 
component in the certain place between the two ends of the axis. The key notion of the 
semantic space model is the notion of dimension, viewed as a certain semantic characteristic 
based on which the meanings are compared and contrasted. 
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The lesson of the un-dramatic examples: Triangulation vs. the community view 
Dana Riesenfeld 
Tel Aviv University 
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The way this problem is solved is best  
appreciated from un-dramatic examples 
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“On the very idea of a conceptual scheme”  
Someone walks into a grocery store asking for five red apples. What happens between 
this person and the grocer? What kind of linguistic encounter occurs between them? And 
what can this ordinary linguistic encounter teach us about linguistic communication in 
general? This famous example is, of course, taken from the first paragraph of 
Wittgenstein’s  Philosophical Investigations. For Wittgenstein, however, this everyday 
example is a paradigmatic one, as he comments: “It is in this and similar ways that one 
operates with words” (1953: §1).  
This ordinary example embodies the main components of Kripke’s community view 
exemplifying the way rules are used. The customer, when asking for five red apples, 
Kripke claims, has certain rule-related expectations of the grocer. Primarily, he “expects 
the grocer to count as he does, not according to some bizarre non-standard rule” 
(1982:92).  For Kripke the encounter between the customer and grocer is a paradigmatic 
example of how Wittgenstein’s picture of language is interwoven into our lives. 
Linguistic rules, Kripke argues, do not exist apart from our usage but are rather reflected 
by an agreement on everyday procedures of their use.  
Davidson sums up Kripke’s view by saying that “to speak a language is to follow rules” 
(2001: 113). This picture is contrary to Davidson’s view of language, asserting that the 
concept of rule is superfluous within a theory of language. Davidson’s later philosophy of 
language revolves around the concept of triangulation; the idea that meaning is the 
outcome of an intention-invested intersection between speaker, hearer, and the world they 
share.  
Kripke’s and Davidson’s fundamental assumptions are radically different. However, their 
conclusions, the picture of linguistic communication they arrive at, is surprisingly similar. 
The aim of this paper is to explain how opposing assumptions can lead to similar 
conclusions. This will be shown by a close examination of the un-dramatic examples such 
as the customer-grocer case. This and other un-dramatic examples used by the 
philosophers, I argue, reveal a surprising affinity between Davison and Kripke’s theories 
of meaning. What seems to be a disagreement au fond is discovered to be a more 
moderate controversy.   
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UP in Motion: Motion events and the acquisition of complex predicates in English 
Caroline Rossi  
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Children's preference for spatial terms (Clark, 1973) is well documented (Bowerman, 
1996), but such asymmetries as the primary spatial (topological) meaning of 
prepositions have proved difficult to isolate in longitudinal follow-ups (Zlatev, 2003; 
Kochan, Morgenstern, Rossi & Sekali, 2007). Adding a functional characterization such 
as Vandeloise’s (2004) of the qualitative, aspectual dimensions of spatial prepositions 
(Cadiot 2002:10) could ease the explanation of children’s preferences (Evans, to 
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appear). The study of motion events (Talmy, 2000) provides another such window into 
early acquisition (Landau & Zukowski, 2003), but presents researchers with the same 
difficulties. The aim of this paper is to show that motion also lacks functional 
characterisation, which is crucial in defining central uses and priority of acquisition. 
The single semantic feature of “motion” failed to account for the development (from 
holophrastic uses to complex predicates) of one of the first prepositions to appear in our 
data: UP. Indeed, against the expectation that adjacent constructions (1) including most 
verbs of movement (2), should come first, UP appears in cleft constructions earlier on 
(3) (Hyams, Schaeffer & Johnson, 1993, Broihier et al 1994): 
 
 (1). You finished up all that juice. 
 (2). Wanna climb up the slide? 
 (3). You finished all that juice up. 
 
 We tracked the development of UP in order to show how qualitative, aspectual 
notions were involved from the start. All utterances containing UP (including child-
directed speech) were coded in two longitudinal sorpora (Demuth, 2006), according to 
contextualized semantic-pragmatic value, relative prominence of UP, and construction 
type (where appropriate). The results suggest an impact of frequency of use as well as of 
factors accounting for prominence (e.g. dislocation) on the acquisition of complex 
predicates. We propose a construction-based interpretation (Goldberg, 2006) integrated 
within an embodied view of language. 
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Embodied intersubjectivity: building bridges between cogling and Merleau-Ponty  
Paul Sambre  
Lessius Antwerp and Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium  
paul.sambre@lessius.eu 
  
This contribution wants to positively restore and reinforce the dialogue between 
phenomenology, i.e. Merleau-Ponty’s enigmatic philosophy of language and some areas of 
cognitive linguistics where echoes of the French philosopher are only indirect or implicit, 
and does so pursuing two heuristic objectives.  
 First, we describe ex negativo the relation between embodiment in Merleau-Ponty 
versus Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) Philosophy in the Flesh (Lawlor: 231-232), which 
only implicitly (Brockman 1999) mention his early Phénoménologie de la perception 
(1945) and provide a critique of poststructuralist versions of Saussurean linguistics. This 
context we confront with Merleau-Ponty’s Phénoménologie and later or posthumous work, in 
which he developed an original philosophy of language where expressivity and meaning 
dynamics are omnipresent.  
 Second, we positively explore Merleau-Ponty’s reflection on intersubjectivity, an 
extension of the Husserlian notion, and take further these ideas into recent cognitive work 
on intersubjectivity (Verhagen 2005, 2007, 2008 and Langacker 2001, 2008), which open 
constructions and cognitive grammar to dynamic, grounded, intersubjective and 
interlocutive relations and where connection with other minds is at stake. We show 
compatibilities between these frameworks and Merleau’s endeavor not only in 
Phénoménologie de la perception, but also in Eloge de la philosophie (1953), Signes (1960) or La prose 
du monde (1969) and possibly L’oeil et l’esprit (1964) and Le Visible et l’invisible (1969), 
publications which lead to a much broader ontological (Edie 1987: 53-54) and linguistically 
founded project about language.  
 This phenomenological work is, not surprisingly, very much in line with cognitive 
preoccupations (Oakley 2009: 79). Our heuristic exploration of Merleau’s legacy, 
(re)discovers previous directions along which his thinking on embodiment and 
intersubjectivity was concerned mainly with supra-individual discourse (Geeraerts 1985: 
364, Fontaine-De Visscher 1974: 63-79), collaborative cognition in communication (Dror 
and Harnad 2008: 20) or textuality (Bucher 1991: 192-193) and with the role of culture in 
the social world (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 2008: 421). Every act of linguistic creation is then 
also a dynamic discursive process with the social Other and has a double status. On the one 
hand, we are aware of other subjects with whom we share common meanings and can 
therefore communicate in reciprocity (Matthews 2006: 118, Spurling 1977: 52). On the 
other, in interaction, we transform meaning (Merleau-Ponty 1960 : 131). This paradox of 
expression between the intersubjective transmission and generation of meaning 
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(Adams 2008: 156) envelops synchrony in diachrony (Merleau-Ponty 1960) and is 
compatible with another interpretation of (post)structuralism.  
 As a result, this paper maintains (Harder 2007: 1262) and further explores the implicit 
(Nerlich and Clarke 2007: 602) and explicit relation between cognitive linguistics and its 
European phenomenological foundations (Zlatev forthcoming), We re-create some of 
Merleau-Ponty’s thinking and make it public (Eco : 161). Merleau-Ponty, as a matter of fact 
keeps asking questions to cognitive linguistics and vice versa. Building bridges between 
cognitive linguistics and Merleau-Ponty illustrates Merleau-Ponty’s own adagium: “Si les 
créations ne sont pas un acquis, ce n’est pas seulement que, comme toutes choses, elles 
passent, c’est aussi qu’elles ont presque toute leur vie devant elles.” (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 
92-93).  
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Creativity, in the sense finding original solutions to life world problems, can be seen as 
the principal force of communicational as well as cognitive genesis, such as when new 
language elements occur, or new semiotic resources appear. But what, then, is 
creativity? Creativity has been thought of as “modifying the rules and constraints [of 
language] by using and combining the existing means in novel ways, proposing new 
meanings and structures” (Heine/Kuteva). Put in slightly other terms, more related to 
the cultivation of human disciplines in general, creativity has been defined as an original 
act that not only make a radical “revision of the content” of a field of interest (as in art, 
sport, science, etc.) but also makes a “change of the rules” by which the discipline 
orients itself (Sahlin). An attention to the rules, or more exactly the modification of tacit 
or explicit rules, would thus seem to be a necessary feature of creative acts without 
which we would be confined to a combinatorics of elements that could only indirectly, 
if at all, be evolutionary, and intersubjective.  
 However, a focus on the rules has a tendency to confine the problem of creativity to 
being one about the refinement of the particular culture/community that makes the rules. 
Art, science, as well as everyday cultural interaction, is communicated and measured 
against a paradigm, a tradition, or a memory, serving as an historical “filter” when we 
evaluate originality. This type of historical (or memory-based) judgement, needed as it 
is for the maintenance of a culture, and for detection of violation against it, also risks 
forwarding a “proper” – in the sense non-creative – way of cultivation.  
 In this paper it is discussed to what extent creativity is not only a matter of finding 
rule-modifying solutions to a problem, but also about expressing unforeseen intentions 
of a more open-ended character. One way of realising open-endedness appears when 
ideas or actions are expressed in more than one context, or in other contexts than the one 
in which they arose. It is here suggested that creativity emerges in – and as – the act of 
shifting the basic communicational context. The main suggestion is that the disciplinary 
contexts in which we position, communicate and measure originality are fundamental 
for how originality, thus also creativity, is defined. It is claimed that it is the 
representational situation itself that makes an original thought discernible in the first 
place. By acknowledging the semiotic notion of “auto-communication” as a “creative 
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function of a text” (Lotman) as well as the cultural semiotics where the point-of-view of 
one culture decides whether other cultures are to be regarded as “text, extra-text, or non-
text” (Sonesson), we get the models needed to argue for a shift-of-context as a creative 
act in itself. These semiotic aspects can then also be discussed in relation to the 
understanding of contextual shifts in the fashion of attention psychology (Arvidson) 
where various types of contextual alteration – like enlargement, contraction, elucidation, 
obscuration, and replacement – are viewed as changing the thematic focus of the 
phenomenon perceived.  
 
Key words: creativity, originality, context 
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Language socialization of Kazakh children  
Asel Shayakhmet  
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Kazakhstan is one of the post Soviet Republics where both Kazakh as an official 
language and Russian as international language function simultaneously. Kazakh 
children have to learn the social conventions for language use, and as a result we have 
children growing up bilingually. 
 We have studied the bilingualism of children who are from 6-7 to 10-11 years old. 
First of all we made the selection which has allowed us to set the bilingual children 
apart those who have a Diglossia. We mean, in Kazakhstan there are many children who 
have acquired spoken Kazakh from their family, but they have not learnt to use the more 
formal styles requiring specific morphological or lexical forms in Kazakh, whereas in 
their Russian they are able to use more complex expressions for specific purposes.  
 After that we divided bilingual children into two groups depending on their 
dominant language. Then we conducted a whole series of principal experiments in order 
to clarify the real skills of our children in speaking. The children had to tell us some 
short stories, retell some ideas, describe the pictures, which were given them, answer 
some simple questions, solve some easy riddles. Talking to children we did not pay their 
attention intentionally at what language they had to use. We gave the bilingual children 
several tasks in Kazakh, and after some period of time – the same or analogous tasks in 
Russian, or vice versa. Under such conditions some children could implement the given 
task in the same language: i.e. if we asked them in Kazakh, they answered in Kazakh 
too; if our question was in Russian, they also used Russian in their answer. Other 
children used both Kazakh, and Russian, although the question was in only one 
language. And we have to admit that the number of first group children is much less 
than the children of second group, i.e. so-called ‘co-ordinate’ bilinguals are rare, 
whereas ‘compound’ bilinguals are typical phenomena of our society, where people 
often switch between their two languages in their conversation, and very few of them 
belong to group having balanced bilingualism.  
 Children’s bilingualism is a very complex phenomenon; there are plentiful factors 
which have an impact on it; among other things we can mention the child’s age, family 
and social situation. In the majority of our cases, Kazakh families use code-switches 
between and even within sentences, involving phrases and words, and sometimes even 
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parts of words. In our social circumstances such type of speech has become quite stable. 
As for types of code-switching, we have rather situational code-switching when 
speakers begin a conversation in Kazakh, after that they switch to Russian, and at the 
end return to Kazakh.  
 According to our questionnaires, those children, who could be placed in a category 
of co-ordinate bilinguals, initially have acquired their native language, so, when they 
started to acquire the second language they had a high level of linguistic competence in 
their native language. 
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Meaning and Materiality: How Language Grounds Symbolic Artefacts 
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The comparison between signs (including the signs of language) and tools has often 
been made. Karl Bühler (1990), influenced by the functionalism of Prague School 
linguistics, proposed the Organon (Greek=tool or instrument) Model of language. Lev 
Vygotsky (1978) also viewed signs as instruments, not only enabling communication 
between individuals, but also transforming intra-individual cognition. Vygotsky 
regarded the analogy as resting on the fact that both sign and tool support mediated 
activity; but he also distinguished between their modes of mediation in that, while tools 
are “outer directed”, transforming the material world, signs are “inner directed”, 
transforming and governing mind, self and behaviour (Vygotsky,1978: 54-55).  
 Tools, of course, are one type of in the wider class of artefacts, but whether language 
as a symbolic system can be considered as an artefact is disputed. Pinker (1994), in 
keeping with his nativist modularist view of the language capacity, denies that language 
is an artefact: he regards language as a part of the natural world, and the capacity for 
language as a part of human nature. 
 We can counter Pinker’s view, however, by pointing out that many species construct 
“artefactual” niches (Laland et al., 2000), and language itself may be considered as a 
universal (transcultural) component of the species-specific human biocultural niche 
(Sinha, 2006, 2009). Language has a dual nature, as part of human species-being, what 
it means to be human, and as the foundational social institution in the Durkheimian 
sense (Durkheim, 1895). Treating language as a biocultural niche yields a new 
perspective on both the human language capacity (falsely identified with language itself 
by generative linguistics) and on the evolution of this capacity. It also enables us to 
understand the significance of language as the symbolic ground of the special subclass 
of symbolic artefacts. This subclass can be defined as comprising those artefacts that 
support symbolic and conceptual processes in abstract conceptual domains, such as time 
and number. Examples of symbolic artefacts are notational systems (including writing 
and numeric notations), dials, calendars and compasses. Cultural and cognitive schemas 
organizing at least some relevant conceptual domains may be considered, I shall argue, 
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as dependent upon, and not merely expressed by, the employment of symbolic artefacts 
in cultural and cognitive practices. 
 To qualify as a symbolic artefact, the artefact must have a representational function, 
in the Bühlerian sense. All artefacts have a signifying status, inasmuch as they 
functionally “count as” instances of the artefact class of which they are a member, to 
use Searle’s expression (Searle, 1995); and their material form signifies their canonical 
function (Sinha and Rodriguez, 2008; Sinha, 2009). However, to be a symbolic artefact, 
the artefact must also represent something outside itself, through a sign function 
materially embodied in the artefact. All such sign functions are ultimately grounded in 
language, although they also frequently incorporate iconic relations. The recruitment of 
objects as signs in interactive contexts is of great importance in cognitive development 
(Sinha, 2005). Intentionally designed symbolic artefacts, just as much as language, are 
constitutive parts of the human biocultural niche, and are of fundamental importance in 
human cultural-cognitive evolution.  
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Illness, storm and war: Metaphors of the financial crisis in the Portuguese press 
and their ideological function  
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The aim of this paper is to analyze the conceptual metaphors that structure the 
Portuguese press journalistic discourse as regards the financial and economical crisis. 
The analysis uses corpus-based methodology and relies on a corpus of news and opinion 
articles extracted from national and economic newspapers published between September 
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2008 and March 2009. It follows the framework of Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
(Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999) and other research areas of Cognitive Linguistics 
(Geeraerts & Cuyckens 2007). The paper investigates the experiential and cultural 
motivations of the metaphors of crisis as well as their ideological functions.  
 The corpus-based analysis shows that there are three main conceptual metaphors 
used in the Portuguese press for crisis:  
 • CRISIS IS ILLNESS: the crisis is a heart failure, it is a contagious and epidemic 
disease, it has pathogenic causes and agents such as famous toxic investments and 
requires various types of therapy and medication  
 • CRISIS IS STORM/EARTHQUAKE: crisis is an atmospheric turbulence, a storm, a 
hurricane, a tornado, a cyclone and a geological earthquake, a shake-up or a tsunami  
 • CRISIS IS ENEMY: to solve the crisis is to fight the enemy through war.  
 These organic, natural and bellicose metaphors are grounded on image schemas 
(Johnson 1987, Hampe 2005) from bodily experience, like ‘in-out’ schema (crisis is a 
force that comes from the outside to the inside of the container and invades a delimited 
area), ‘up-down’ schema (crisis is a loss of balance, from which results the collapse of 
the system) and a number of ‘force dynamics’ schemas (crisis is an irresistible and 
destructive external force and reacting to the crisis implies a superior counter-force).  
 The embodiment of crisis metaphors turns them into cognitive models with 
important ideological functions (Dirven, Frank & Pütz 2003). These metaphors are used 
in order to say that nobody knows anything about the current world financial crisis, to 
blame external and uncontrollable causes, to take off responsibility from Western 
policies, financial and economic systems, to reduce the responsibility of economic and 
political agents, to focus on the negative aspects of free market economies and hide their 
benefits, and they also serve to prone economic catharsis or the promise of a radical 
change.  
 We will argue that the corpus-based study of metaphor provides empirical evidence 
about the relevance, hierarchy and typical configurations of metaphorical source 
domains and about the ideological functions of metaphor in the public discourse too. 
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Practically all theories of iconicity are denunciations of its subject matter: thus, for 
instance Goodman, Bierman and the early Eco all maintain that there can be no iconic 
signs, since all signs are conventional. My own theory of iconicity was developed in 
order to save a particular kind of iconicity, pictoriality, from such criticism (Sonesson 
1989; 2000). Since I did not believe in the simple assertation of similarity as such, I had 
to distinguish pure iconicity, iconic ground, and iconic sign, on one hand, and primary 
and secondary iconic signs, on the other hand. Since then, the conceptual tools that I 
created to explain pictoriality have been shown by others to be relevant to linguistic 
iconicity (Willems & de Cuypere, eds. 2008). At the time, the issue tended to be 
conceived outside of time, but since then evolution and development has taken the front 
stage of scientific preoccupations. Nevertheless, the categories of my theory of iconicity 
has turned out to be even more relevant in this context. In the evolutionary semiotics of 
Deacon (1997), iconicity is referred to in such as general way that is seems to be 
emptied of all content, while in the variety invented by Donald (1991) the term mimesis 
is used for a particular phase in the evolution of iconic meaning. While I can account for 
the problems of Deacon’s theory, the ambiguous notion of imitation seems to be the 
clue to the apparent difficulties of Donald’s evolutionary scheme. The aim of this paper 
is to consider to what extent the extension of iconicity theory to new domains, in 
particular to evolution and development, will necessitate the development of new 
models.  
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Analyzing metaphoric expressions in TV reports reveals that one and the same 
metaphor may be realized not only on the verbal level but also in other modalities like 
gesture or intonation as well as through specific film techniques like camera 
perspective, camera movement or editing. Throughout a whole report, these realizations 
are describable as a dynamic foregrounding process of metaphoricity (cf. Müller 2008; 
Müller & Cienki 2009; Müller & Tag subm.) and they establish a complex aesthetic 
audiovisual composition based on Expressive Movement (Ausdrucksbewegung) 
(Kappelhoff 2004, 2008a). In our talk we will put forward the argument that 
reconstructing multimodal metaphoric expressions in audiovisual images requires an 
approach which builds on both cognitive-linguistic and film-aesthetic research.  
 The theoretical and methodological background of our presentation thus is, on the 
one hand, Müller's cognitive-linguistic dynamic view on metaphors in language use 
(Müller 2008), reconstructing the embodied nature of the activation of metaphoricity in 
spoken discourse and text-image compositions, and, on the other hand, Kappelhoff's 
film-analytical approach to expressive movements as aesthetic structures of audiovisual 
images (Kappelhoff 2004, 2008b). Each approach makes an important contribution to 
current research on multimodal metaphors in the respective discipline, i.e. in cognitive 
linguistics (cf. Forceville 2009; Forceville & Urios-Aparisi 2009) and in media and 
communication research (cf. Fahlenbrach 2008). In this talk, we will outline first steps 
in bringing together Müller's and Kappelhoff's work. By presenting macro- as well as 
microanalytical takes on a report on the current financial crisis broadcasted in the 
German political TV programme "Report Mainz", we will illustrate how the cognitive-
linguistic Metaphor Foregrounding Analysis (Müller & Tag subm.) and the film-
analytical method of analyzing aesthetic structures of audiovisual images in terms of 
Expressive Movement (Kappelhoff 2004, 2008a) can be combined and applied to the 
analysis of TV news. These analyses not only reveal the dynamic and multimodal nature 
of metaphoric foregrounding and the establishment of a film-aesthetic compositional 
structure in the process of time but also that within this structure metaphoric expressions 
may be systematically intertwined and related to one another. Thus, the combination of 
a linguistic and a film-analytical take provides a new interdisciplinary approach that 
enhances the analysis of multimodal metaphors in audiovisual images.  
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Archaeologists, neuroscientists and philosophers all aim to shed light on the holistic and 
coconstitutive role played by bodies and brains, objects and culture over the course of 
hominin cognitive evolution. Archaeology can, with an ever increasing precision, tell us 
where and when Homo sapiens sapiens emerged. The ‘where’ is Africa and the ‘when’ 
is some time between 100 000 and 200 000 years ago yet the archaeological record 
began some 2.5 million years ago. Gaining insight into human cognitive evolution and 
the emergence of the modern mind will involve coming to terms with the archaeological 
record across evolutionary change. 
 Advances in neuroscience and brain imaging have enabled researchers to explore the 
foundation for tool using capacity in modern human brains. Stout et al have advanced, 
on the basis of a recent (FDG-PET) study, a thesis for the coevolution of language and 
tool manufacture: tantalisingly, the neural circuits that support tool manufacture overlap 
with those that support language. The implication of this research is that both linguistic 
behaviour and tool manufacture are grounded in the more basic, but nevertheless 
complex, capacities for intentional (goal-directed) activity within an environment of 
pragmatic concern and it is likely that both language and tool-use evolved in a mutually 
supporting and co-constituting manner. 
 My paper will depart from accounts of tools that emphasise material culture as a 
signifying system and I will qualify such theses in terms that satisfactorily account for 
both linguistic meaning and the meanings of material things. I will do this by extending 
and complementing phenomenological discussions of action and agency in and I will 
show how, for example, the stone tool is constituted as a cutting tool by virtue of the 
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agents’ meaningful/purposeful appropriation of it to the task of cutting. I shall argue that 
such pragmatic and meaningbestowing appropriation is operative throughout hominin 
evolution; I shall qualify my argument in terms that build upon growing empirical 
evidence and I will show how such evidence can be conceptualised in terms suggested 
by phenomenological philosophers. I will argue that material culture (taken as a 
signifying system wherein meaning is rethought as use) and language can be combined 
within this perspective that emphasises the ‘linguisticality’ of hominin engagement with 
the world. Given the antiquity of tool industries and the overlap between neural circuits 
that has been identified, linguisticality as a feature of hominin mentality predates the 
evolution of natural languages. Drawing on thinkers in archaeology and philosophy 
such as Mithen and Dunbar, Woodruff Smith and Thomasson, Wheeler and Clark, and 
from classical thinkers such as Wittgenstein and Heidegger, my paper will show how 
linguisticality provides a unifying analytic device for conceptualizing holistically 
hominin cognitive evolution. 
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Mental verbs (including both perception and emotion) often exhibit grammatical 
peculiarities both syntactically and semantically, and these features have troubled 
theoretical linguists. In this paper, we argue that the evolutionary development of 
mental verbs differ in timing, but follow a similar pattern to other verbs. In other words, 
the development of mental verb recapitulates that of other verbs. Therefore, mental 
verbs can play an important role in understanding some of the earlier stages in our 
language evolution. 
 One of the unique features in the mental verbs is the causation. It is common that 
human or other animate entities are considered as actor and becoming the subject of a 
clause as a doer or causer of an event. However, human entities are mere recipient of 
outer sanitation and the amount of causation involved is considerably smaller. What is 
obvious here is that the direct object as a patient in ordinary verbs and the direct object 
as an experiencer in mental verbs are more or less the same both semantically and 
syntactically. 
 This is why the origin of the grammatical markers for them originates from either 
the dative or allative case marking, signalling the end point of the energy transfer. This 
fact also accounts for the dative subject for mental verbs in many languages. Some 
languages have developed further than the other verbs and turn the dative experiencer 
into the nominative, making it syntactically identical to agent, but a number of 
languages still preserve the older system of the dative experiencer. 
 Evolutionary, the causation was expressed using a metaphorical extension of spatial 
sense, from actor to undergoer. In addition, it is most likely that the nouns are divided 
into active and inactive nouns, meaning that only active nouns could be actor and 
inactive nouns, undergoer (cf. Algonquian languages). In this environment, mental 
verbs are not likely to appear, since those entities referred to by animate nouns are 
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experiencer. This is perhaps why mental verbs were not appeared first. When mental 
verbs appeared, they used the same principle of metaphorical extension of spatial 
movement, but by this time, earlier spatial markers had been grammaticalised as case 
markers such as accusative. 
 The late development of the mental verbs is due to the mixture of various features, 
but perhaps animacy of experiencer was important, i.e. it was considered by default that 
human entities are actor in unmarked structure, and this is not suitable for mental verbs. 
Since there is a parallel pattern in historical development, the development of the mental 
verbs, which we can still observe with historical data, can be an important indicator of 
earlier stages of other verbs. 
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Mundane life is full of memorable events and experiences that we enjoy sharing with 
other people as amuzing anecdotes or elaborate stories. In this presentation I will show, 
how gestures reveal intra- and interpersonal (cognitive) processes of the speaker during 
one activity type (telling of an anecdote). Here I mean with intrapersonal “what the 
speaker is doing at a moment” and with interpersonal “how this doing is part of the 
surrounding social situation”. My primary (naturalistic) data is one anecdote and its 
micro-analysis using the concepts bodily mimesis and dynamicity. To address 
intrapersonal processes, I will use definition bodily mimesis (Zlatev) to show how 
during recounting the past experience the visuo-spatial aspects of actions and objects, 
and shifting perspective between protagonists are represented through pantomime and 
gestures. These mimetic representations reflect the mental imagery of the experience 
and thus the intrapersonal cognitive processes of the speaker. Furthermore, the same 
applies analogically for signed languages. Narratives based on real life are executed in 
Finnish Sign Language in a more complicated manner than those based on fiction only, 
and the analysis of the signed anecdote in Rissanen is not at all unlike my example of 
spoken anecdote when it comes to bodily mimesis as reflection of imagery. To address 
the interpersonal processes, I will apply the approach developed in the dynamic view of 
metaphors (Müller). I will show how speaker shifts from merely recounting the past 
experience to simultaneously expressing the elevance of the recounting in the given 
discourse context, and as the speaker‟s focus of attention shifts from intrapersonal to 
interpersonal he relocates the new gesture distinct from the prior gesture space. These 
kind of distinct locations of gestures reflect the speaker‟s simultaneous monitoring of 
the social situation, thus revealing the interpersonal cognitive processes. Other research 
on location of gesture has established that the location is relevant in deictic and iconic 
(motion) gestures as part of meaning of the expression and that use of gesture space is 
also sensitive to the number and position of the interlocutors. For the time being I want 
to bring to awareness that occasionally the use of gesture space expresses sensitivity to 
the social situation in a more abstract, contextual manner. To sum up, when embodied 
experience gets “translated” into situated language gestures reveal the underlying 
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cognitive processes of the translation, because gestures are manifestations of these 
underlying cognitive processes.  
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“Bringing history in”: From the sociolinguistic to a historical paradigm of 
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Sociolinguistics have made considerable progress in the last decades with respect to the 
analysis of correlations between linguistic variants and non-linguistic social and cultural 
factors; and linguistic variations have been correlated with differences in social 
determinants like gender, age and social position. More and more of these external 
factors have been tested as regards their potential influence on the choice of linguistic 
variants.  
Despite all these achievements, there seem to be two principal problems inherent in the 
sociolinguistic paradigm: a) Sociolinguistics concentrates on micro-variables, i.e. the 
factors which characterize the linguistic profiles of single speakers or smaller groups of 
speakers. It tends to ignore the complex framework of “big” political-social-economic-
cultural conditions of language and language change at large. b) Above all, 
sociolinguistics tends to neglect the concrete, i.e. individual-historical configurations of 
linguistic variants and non-linguistic determinants in favor of an analysis which places 
the variables, as it were, beyond historical space and time. But language historians 
(intensively assisted by „general historians∅) should be capable to explain concrete, 
individual historical processes of language change in their particular historical settings. 
There may be a „short link∅ between external factors and the linguistic phenomena 
caused by them. But in most cases, the link is indirect, i.e. mediated by linguistic norms, 
in the broad range between informal/implicit and politically or administratively 
produced/explicit: norms which are no abstracta, but again generated by concrete 
historical actors and their interests.  
Taking 20th century German language history as an exemplary case, we shall present 
proposals on how the sociolinguistic paradigm might be extended towards such a 
genuinely historical paradigm of language history writing. We shall distinguish two 
different layers. On the first level, the complex bundle of political-socioeconomic-
cultural modernization trends of European history: long lines which are considerably 
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intensified in the 20th century. There is, e.g., a growing differentiation of society which 
manifests itself in a significant increase in horizontal and vertical social mobility or in 
the growing complexity of the economy. This trend is reflected in the rising number and 
complexity of linguistic registers and different types of texts between which a speaker 
must be able to switch. These general European trends are, on the second level, 
intensified by the special factors of German history. Here, we are not in the first place 
interested in the notorious impacts of the “big disruptions” of 1918, 1933, 1945/8 and 
1989 on the “political regions” of the German lexicon. Our focus is “creeping”, i.e. 
incremental language change as effectuated by the permanent, mostly unobtrusive 
influences of historically concrete (political, administrative, educational etc.) individual 
and institutional actors (including the Zeitgeist) producing, implementing and enforcing 
language norms. We intend to develop a systematic, comprehensive scheme of analysis 
as regards the complex constellations and interactions in this field, embedding them into 
the general social and cultural history of Germany, hereby tracing the long lines of 
development from the Kaiserreich to re-unified Germany. 
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Directional adposition use in English, Swedish and Finnish  
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Directional adpositions such as to the left of describe where a Figure is in relation to a 
Ground. English and Swedish directional adpositions refer to the location of a Figure in 
relation to a Ground, whether both are static or in motion. In contrast, the Finnish 
directional adpositions edellä (in front of) and jäljessä (behind) solely describe the 
location of a moving Figure in relation to a moving Ground (Nikanne, 2003).  
 When using directional adpositions, a frame of reference must be assumed for 
interpreting the meaning of directional adpositions. For example, the meaning of to the 
left of in English can be based on a relative (speaker or listener based) reference frame 
or an intrinsic (object based) reference frame (Levinson, 1996). When a Figure and a 
Ground are both in motion, it is possible for a Figure to be described as being behind or 
in front of the Ground, even if neither have intrinsic features. As shown by Walker (in 
preparation), there are good reasons to assume that in the latter case a motion based 
reference frame is involved. This means that if Finnish speakers would use edellä (in 
front of) and jäljessä (behind) more frequently in situations where both the Figure and 
Ground are in motion, a difference in reference frame use between Finnish on one hand 
and English and Swedish on the other could be expected. 
 We asked native English, Swedish and Finnish speakers’ to select adpositions from a 
language specific list to describe the location of a Figure relative to a Ground when both 
were shown to be moving on a computer screen. We were interested in any differences 
between Finnish, English and Swedish speakers. 
 All languages showed a predominant use of directional spatial adpositions referring 
to the lexical concepts TO THE LEFT OF, TO THE RIGHT OF, ABOVE and BELOW. 
There were no differences between the languages in directional adpositions use or 
reference frame use, including reference frame use based on motion.  
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 We conclude that despite differences in the grammars of the languages involved, and 
potential differences in reference frame system use, the three languages investigated 
encode Figure location in relation to Ground location in a similar way when both are in 
motion. 
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The cultural diversity of Poland is not widely known yet there are few cultures in the 
country that stand aside from other people and maintain their centuries old ways of life. The 
best known for this are Ślązacy and Kaszubi (Kashubian). The latter experienced the very 
important change in the recognition of their culture in the world: their language, preserved 
for many years despite of numerous attempts to destroy it, was given the CSB code in year 
2003. This fact had the huge influence on the social and legal changes in the lives of 
Kashubian people - the language is now taught in local schools, may be used in all 
administrative offices, and may also be learned as a foreign language. It gives the 
Kashubian people much more possibilities for maintaining their culture but also puts them 
aside from other local cultures. Centuries old conflicts between Kashubian people and their 
neighbors (who speak different dialects of Polish that are not considered separate 
languages) were awaken by the fact that Kashubian language was accepted as a original and 
completely separate from Polish.  
Based on this example my research tries to prove how the legalization of the language 
influences its culture and how it affects people’s everyday life. 
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Monuments in metonymy: mapping Old Scandinavian communication networks 
through the evolution of Norse kenningar 
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The emergence of increasingly rich models of communication facilitates 
correspondingly enhanced historical reconstructions. Dialogues between Indo-European 
linguists and both anthropologists and archaeologists have taken the comparative 
method beyond the algebra of phonemic equations to consider the concepts and customs 
that cognate lexemes and syntagmata diachronically trace. This paper draws on insights 
into the social dynamics of language acquisition to build upon the cognitive modelling 
of Indo-European poiesis formulated by Peabody (1975), Nagy (1990) and Watkins 
(1995).  
 Indo-European registers a sweeping backdrop of cultural transformation, since the 
common parent language reflects the material culture of the so-called Secondary 
Products Revolution in the Neolithic economy (Mallory & Adams 2006:284). As the 
social institutions of this population would have been correspondingly constrained, the 
transition from ‘small world’ communication networks (Watts & Strogatz 1998) to 
scale-free networks (Barabási & Albert 1999) of more expansive speech communities 
should lie squarely within the historical evolution of the Indo-European daughter 
languages.  
 Beyond its phonology and grammar, the Indo-European linguistic inheritance 
included characteristic symbolic stratagems for conceptualizing cognition. This might 
be considered a common poetics whose historically contingent variations produced the 
diverse traditions attested among the various cohorts of Indo-European speakers. Along 
with those from Ireland, the Punjab and the Aegean, the earliest documented traditions 
for Scandinavia provide valuable evidence for reconstructing the more archaic strata of 
such poiesis, as corpora of particularly retentive natural language varieties were 
recorded in these milieux.  
 In this paper, Ogura and Wang’s (2004) theory of a language game as producing 
change spread by cooperation in interaction among individuals will be applied to the 
analysis of the kenning system of Norse scaldic poetics. Their model allows this 
traditional discursive genre to be analysed as a dynamic and adaptive system, whose 
most characteristic traits progressively emerge from less salient variants within both 
proto-Germanic and proto-Indo-European strata of the tradition.  
 The natural logic underlying the metonymy in Norse kenningar is likely universal 
(v. Lakoff 1987:74): examples like Modern English dust bunny or eye candy are neither 
particularly rare nor artificial coinages (cf. Benczes 2006:175-77). Such constructions 
may be of common Indo-European heritage (Watkins 1995:44f.). What distinguishes 
Old Norse kenningar is the scalds’ trend to vary the construction beyond the emulated 
prototype either through lexical substitution within conceptual categories (hence *lint 
kitten or *filth hamster along the pattern of dust bunny) or through syntactic recursion 
(thus *soul window candy after the precedent of eye candy).  
 While such metonymic constructions could be developed to express any concept, the 
scaldic system is as highly skewed in its development (Gurevich 1994). Such skewing 
can result from the biases in reinforcement generated by certain key nodes within the 
scale-free networks which progressively took root in Viking-Age Scandinavia. Such key 
nodes generated the prototypes around which systemic variation became focussed to 
produce normativity. Thus the potential of Ogura and Wang’s model to map socially 
biased change within a dynamic system can shed light on the historically attested 
evolution of scaldic metonymy, as well as on that of its prehistoric precursors. 
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Interpreting novel noun-noun compounds: A matter of semantics, pragmatics, or 
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The question concerning the boundary between semantics and pragmatics is 
proverbially difficult. As with many distinctions concerning language that were 
previously regarded as dichotomous (e.g., lexicon/grammar, langue/parole, and open-
class/closed-class items), it is now often stated, without much argumentation, that it is 
rather a “matter of a continuum”. As pointed out by Itkonen (2006), however, this is a 
case of a typical fallacy in linguistic argumentation: it is a mistake to assume that if 
there is no sharp distinction between two categories, then there is no boundary at all. In 
the presentation, we argue on the basis of empirical research on the interpretation of 
noun-noun compounds (NNCs) for a three part distinction between: (a) semantics – 
commonly known conventions of meaning; (b) pragmatics – context-specific meaning 
going beyond conventional meaning; and (c) context-general schemas – structures that 
serve as biases for interpretations, but which can be, unlike (a), easily overridden.  
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 In a series of experiments, we presented Danish participants with novel NNCs 
referring to fictive food products both with and without sentential context. Each NNC 
had the form: [N1: Place-name/Modifier + N2: Food-term/Head] – e.g., Madras curry. 
The results provided evidence against a “pragmatics only” view since most NNCs 
yielded a preferred interpretation even when presented out of context: Food 
ORIGINATES IN Place. When this was not the case, as with Balkan-pizza or Bangkok-
kotletter (“Bangkok pork chops”), this was explicable as a result of the semantics (and 
encyclopedic knowledge) associated with the constituent nouns. However, when in a 
second experiment the same NNCs were presented in sentential context that was 
contextually incongruent with ORIGINATES IN, this interpretation was consistently 
graded lower than alternatives. From previous research, and from our more recent 
experiments, we know that the meanings of similar conventional NNCs such as Parma 
ham are not so easily affected by context. 
 The results support the conception, currently expressed in a number of cognitive-
functional linguistic frameworks (Langacker, 1987; Croft, 2001; Bybee, 2006), that 
linguistic constructs and meanings exist at different levels of schematicity. At the same 
time, our findings imply that the semantic status of such higher-level schemas is not 
identical to that of particular conventional NNCs. The conclusion is the linguistic 
knowledge of type (c), taken an intermediary position between (a) and (b). 
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Rizzolatti and Arbib’s (1998) proposed that a shared understanding of action grounds 
the emergence of gesture, leading eventually to language. De Leon’s research (2000) 
supports the view that nonverbal interaction plays a central role in socializing children 
to engage in communicative acts. Unpacking “nonverbal interaction” has documented 
that assisting infants to imitate cultivates their use of cultural objects and nurtures a 
shared understanding of daily life (Zukow-Goldring, 2006). Recent longitudinal studies 
make the link between action, gesture, and word more explicit. Adeptly engaging in 
everyday activities not only leads to“content-loaded” gestures in those settings, but 
eventually to producing words with 
 83 
corresponding meaning (Bavin et al., 2008; Blake et al., 2005; Camaioni et al., 2003; 
Capirci et al, 2005; Volterra et al, 2005). The present research investigated how 
caregiver messages during assisted imitation might foster infants’ transition from action 
to gesture. 
 Method. The longitudinal sample consisted of five English-speaking, Euro-
American middle-class and six Spanish-speaking, Latino working-class families with 
infants of 6 months, living in the Western US. The families participated until the infant 
produced more than one-word at a time, around 21-26 months. We collected all 
caregiver actions and gestures that directed infants to engage in ongoing activities from 
twenty-minute monthly videos of naturalistic interaction at home. These messages 
included embodying the infant and demonstrating actions, as well as indexical and 
iconic gestures. The activities varied in complexity: simple bodily movements; action 
with a single object, with person(s) and object; relations between multiple objects; 
part/whole relations; tool use. 
 Results. Multivariate frequency analyses examined culture, caregiver message, 
activity complexity, and infant age. Significant correlations were found between age, 
complexity of activity, and caregiver message. 
 Discussion. Day-in and day-out, caregivers pick-out actions and gestures for infants 
to pick-up that may provide the basis for early communication. Overall, caregiver 
messages within activity types begin with embodying, gradually shifting to 
demonstrations that invite infants to imitate, then gradually shifting to indexical signs, 
and finally conveying information with iconic gestures. 
 While tutoring/transferring a new skill, caregivers often embody infants as the two 
go through the motions of an activity together. When moving as one, the infant may 
detect regularities or higher-order, intersensory invariants (propioceptively, 
kinesthetically, visually, tactilely) in the synchronous onset/offset, rhythm, and tempo of 
the action that specify a correspondence between caregiver and infant movements. 
Detecting this synchrony may “bind” different sources of perceptual information 
together (Spence, 2007), making it possible to assess what is relevant from what is 
“background noise.” These findings suggest that assisted imitation contributes to a 
shared understanding of ongoing events, a precursor to communicative development. 
 Not surprisingly, a significant correlation was found between age and complexity of 
the activity. The arc over time of caregiver action/gesture messages precedes and 
predicts the trajectory of action/gesture development in infants reported in prior studies 
(see above), pointing to caregiver interaction as the birthplace of infant action and 
gesture. The next steps: to investigate the relation of these caregiver data to the 
emergence of their infants’ 
action/gesture repertoires as well as their words. 
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CIENKI 
 
Spoken language usage events 
Alan Cienki 
Vrije Universiteit (VU), Amsterdam, Netherlands 
a.cienki@let.vu.nl 
 
Cognitive Grammar draws on the notion of “usage events” of language as the starting 
point from which linguistic units are schematized by language users. A usage event is 
understood as encompassing physical, social, and cognitive factors, including for 
spoken language “the full phonetic detail of an utterance, as well as any other kinds of 
signals, such as gestures and body language” (Langacker 2008: 457). It is thus 
multimodal in nature and has a dynamic contour. However, in practice, this 
multimodality and dynamicity has yet to be incorporated into analyses in Cognitive 
Grammar. What kinds of recurrent structures are there in the dynamic multimodality of 
spoken language usage events which should be taken into account as linguistic units?  
 First, within the sonic modality itself, intonation can have a grammatical role, which 
could plausibly be accounted for within Cognitive Grammar as part of the phonological 
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pole of a complex linguistic symbolic structure. Second, recent work on the 
motoric/visual modality makes claims about the grammatical function of gestures in 
certain contexts, such as the expression of negation and the progressive aspect in 
English (Harrison 2009) or the ‘definite indefinite’ article son in colloquial German 
(Fricke 2008). This talk will consider the roles played by gestures along the semantic-
pragmatic continuum including how far these can be considered entrenched 
grammatically in different languages based on existing empirical research. We see that 
some classes of grammatical categories take advantage of motoric-visual resources for 
expression more than others, meaning that grammar is multimodal in a variable fashion, 
with multimodality being exploited differentially.  
 The nature of usage events of spoken language results not only in different kinds of 
grammatical structures in spoken versus written language (e.g., Croft 1995; Du Bois 
2003), but also in the expression of different kinds of semantic content in the two forms 
of language use (Author 2008). With this in mind, it becomes problematic to speak of a 
‘semantics’ in Cognitive Linguistics in general which is unspecified as to the mode of 
linguistic production/reception. In addition, Langacker (2008) notes that in any usage 
event, “Part of an expression’s contextual import is ... an assessment by each 
interlocutor of what the other knows and is currently attending to” (p. 220), echoing the 
importance of interactional factors that are already considered fundamental in fields 
such as Conversation Analysis. In conclusion, taking the notion of ‘usage event’ 
seriously involves giving greater credence to the fundamental differences between 
language as spoken versus as written, a claim also supported by research on languages 
in cultures without a written tradition versus in those with one (e.g., Güldemann & von 
Roncador 2002). 
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Local meaning-negotiation, activity types, and the current-discourse-space model 
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Any approach to interaction is faced with a fundamental dilemma: How can the 
empirical fact that meaning is locally and interactionally managed (cf. Sacks, Schegloff, 
and Jefferson 1974) be reconciled with the empirical fact that conversations are subject 
to genres or activity-types which impose overarching expectations of allowable 
contributions and corresponding inferences (cf. Levinson 1992, Clark 1996: 30; 
Verschueren 1999: 49-50)? This theoretical paper is an attempt to overcome this 
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theoretical and analytical dilemma from the cognitive-linguistic perspective of 
Langacker’s (2001) current-discourse-space (CDS) model and Barsalou’s dynamic 
model of situated categorization (2003, 2005). To substantiate and illustrate its 
theoretical considerations, the paper draws on a corpus of 100 spoken tourist-
information transactions that were recorded in Switzerland. 
 The paper argues that the usage-based conception of language advocated by 
cognitive linguists, Langacker’s CDS model in particular, offers an epistemological 
escape route from the discourse-analytical dilemma. Based on the assumption that 
conventional linguistic knowledge (including discursive expectations) is derived from 
actual language use, the CDS model can account for both context-specific 
conceptualization practices and the more conventional conceptual states that are 
associated with a given speech-activity type. 
 Barsalou’s model of situated and dynamic categorization claims that any form of 
knowledge is stored in terms of simulators. Simulators consist of perceptual symbols 
(Barsalou 1999), the mental distillates of rich and multi-modal experiences. By 
combining this view of mental representation with the CDS-model, we can claim that 
genres are mentally represented in the form of genre-simulators; i.e. abstract mental 
representations of discursive conventions that have been digested from concrete 
instances of language use. More specifically, genre-simulators consist of the discursive 
correlates of perceptual symbols, i.e. complex arrangements of discursive cues such as 
lexical choices, turn design, turn-taking (adjacency pairs), and the sequential order of 
turns (see Heritage 2005). By evoking (some of) these cues in a given conversation, the 
interactional partners can detect the ‘interactional fingerprint’ (Heritage 2005) of the 
activity that they are currently performing. Thus by orienting to these signals, they can 
activate genre-simulators in order to mutually simulate a specific speech-activity, e.g. 
booking, giving directions, or selling-buying.  
 Through the strategic manipulation of the symbolic environment that is evoked via 
the discursive cues, speakers can also depart from a given speech-activity simulation. 
By evoking cues that deviate from the expected state of the CDS, speakers can provoke 
their communicative partners to simulate a discourse space that runs counter to the 
conventional speech-activity simulation. In doing so, they can invite their partners to 
engage with a different speech activity, e.g. humour, teasing, etc. Thus, by locally 
managing the state of the CDS via discursive signals, the interactors can influence their 
speech-activity simulations in order to negotiate the process of meaning-generation (as 
advocated by CA). However, this local negotiation of meaning is only possible against 
the background of the interactors’ assumption of the speech-activity that they are 
currently performing. These assumptions can only be formed relative to the stable 
knowledge of discursive conventions (as advocated by genre analysis) that are stored in 
the genre-simulators.  
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Blending in Ethnomethodology? 
Anders Hougaard, University of Southern Denmark 
hougaard@language.sdu.dk 
 
In this paper I reanalyse three “classic” examples of what Fauconnier and Turner call 
“conceptual blends” (aka “blending”), “the regatta”, “Death the Grim Reaper” and “the 
bypass”, all of which will be quite familiar to those who know the work of Fauconnier 
and Turner. All of them appear recurrently in the talks, books and papers by the fathers 
of blending analysis and stand out as some of the central data in the establishment of 
this framework of analysis. The reanalyses are carried out within the sociological 
framework of ethnomethodology. The purpose of this effort is to provide a concrete and 
shared basis for a direct comparison of an ethnomethodological and the blending 
approach to sense making.   Of particular interest to this comparison will be if and how 
the notion of blending may have a place in an ethnomethodological approach to sense 
making and if and how procedures and concerns of ethnomethodological analysis may 
appropriate blending as a resource of analysis. It will be argued that both may be the 
case given a respecification of blending as a device, procedure and resource of ordinary 
people’s handling and making sense of their social world. 
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It’s like, why fictive interaction? On the multifunctionality of direct speech in the 
jury room 
Esther Pascual, Groningen University 
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This presentation deals with fictive interaction (Pascual 2002, 2006), a cognitive 
phenomenon that reflects the interactional structure of conversation, and is manifested 
in language structure and use (e.g. “an attitude that says ‘what’s in it for me?’”, “a 
‘what’s in it for me?’ attitude”). The focus is the conceptualization and use of embedded 
fictive interaction in a real-life jury deliberation in a murder trial broadcasted by an American 
television station. Examples are instances following a preposition (e.g. “the first part about yes 
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I did it, this is how I did it), used as a noun (e.g. “this just say no to drugs”) or as a 
compound specifier of a noun head (e.g. “the whole he used to go to church thing”). In 
this data, a vast number of direct speech constituents are used metonymically in order to mentally access 
(possible) thoughts, decisions, emotions, attitudes, intentions and actions of a fictive enunciator. I argue 
that such functional versatility is mainly motivated by a (perhaps universal) 
understanding of talk-in-interaction as indicative of the utterer’s mental, emotional and 
behavioral world. This is claimed to be motivated by our cultural model of speaking as 
entailing what one believes and also was is objectively true (Sweetser, 1987). In this light, the 
direct speech construction appears as a fuzzy category within a continuum of various 
ways of enacting dialogue.  
 I suggest that the very existence of fictive interaction disproves the assumption that 
direct speech can refer only to communicative acts (Banfield 1973). Furthermore, fictive 
interaction can serve as an umbrella term that satisfactorily covers under-studied and 
un-studied phenomena, as well as a wide range of well-known −but formerly unrelated− 
phenomena. The term fictive interaction is also more accurate than Tannen’s (1986) 
‘constructed dialogue’, since genuine quotations and common phrases can be also used 
fictively (e.g. “an but I didn’t inhale excuse”, “the ‘shop ‘til you drop’ ethos”). A 
cognitive fictive interaction account is also more explanatory than Clark & Gerrig’s 
(1990) ‘quotations as demonstrations’, which is based on iconicity rather than 
interaction, and does not distinguish between genuine and fictive uses.  
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When speakers communicate verbally with one another, one of the first tasks they must 
undertake is to connect. Participants strive to create engagement with their partners in 
discourse, not only by coordinating with them regarding the subject matter they 
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mutually manifest an interest in, but also by attending to and shaping key aspects of the 
form of the language being produced. Effective support of co-participants’ 
communicative, cognitive, and collaborative needs draws heavily on the capacity to 
manage in precise ways certain details of linguistic form and meaning, as participants 
mobilize, in the very moment of dialogic interaction, appropriate words and structures 
to achieve engagement in real time.  
 The complexity of conversational co-participants’ achievement is addressed in a new 
theory, currently under development by the present author and his associates, known as 
dialogic syntax. As a phenomenon, the most visible reflex of dialogic syntax occurs 
when one speaker reuses linguistic elements, structures, and functions recently invoked 
by a prior speaker. As a theory, dialogic syntax seeks to describe and explain this 
phenomenon in terms of how linguistic structures, semiotic practices, and 
sociocognitive resources are organized to make possible the achievement of structured 
engagement in discourse.  
 This paper addresses two of the foundational concepts of the theory of dialogic 
syntax, working to develop a secure methodological and theoretical framework for 
analyzing what speakers know—and do—about framing the linguistic structures that 
support communicative engagement, yielding the sociocognitive achievement of 
intersubjectivity in interaction. The first concept is resonance, defined as the activation 
of affinities across utterances. Resonance is always a property of the relation between 
two elements, and can never be attributed to any element considered in isolation. For 
example, if one speaker says to another, It’s kind of like you Ken, and the second 
responds, That’s not at all like me, Joanne, we can observe a number of resonances, 
embodied in the analogic mappings it:that, -’s:-’s, like:like, you:me, Ken:Joanne, and 
even kind of : not at all. As this example shows, resonance may be derived from a 
diverse array of linguistic principles at almost any level, including relations of 
morphological identity, semantic synonymy or antonymy, paradigmatic equivalence, 
and so on. The second concept is the diagraph, intended to provide a summary 
representation of the overall structure, as perceived by participants, of the total array of 
resonance relations between two (or more) utterances. A basic diagraph for the above 
exchange is: 
 
JOANNE: it     ’s  kind of     like   you    Ken . 
KEN: that      ’s  not at all   like  me     Joanne . 
 
The paper presents numerous examples of diagraphs, both simple and complex, drawn 
from naturally occurring conversations, in order to argue for various methodological 
principles for constructing these putative representations of speaker knowledge about 
the structure of resonance relations. Finally, the paper considers some of the pragmatic, 
cognitive, and interactional consequences for participants of choosing to use of 
resonance and dialogic syntax. 
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Any encompassing model of interactional discourse has to be able to account for the role 
and mutual dynamics of two fundamental principles of interactional language use: 
intersubjectivity and the fact that conversation is always embedded in a social context and 
serves interpersonal goals.  
 Following Verhagen (2005, 2008) dialogue production and understanding involves a 
process of intersubjective cognitive coordination: when speakers (co-)construct discourse, 
they take into account other minds, their relation to themselves and to the object of 
conceptualization. In previous studies (Zima, forthcoming), we made the case for an 
analysis of cross-turn parallelism in terms of interactional intersubjectivity, drawing on 
Verhagen’s Cognitive Grammar model of the intersubjective construal configuration and 
Langacker’s Current Discourse Space-model (Langacker 2001, 2008). In this contribution, 
we expand on the issue of interactional intersubjectivity by shedding light on how speakers 
in adversarial parliamentary interaction take stance, i.e. frame their own perspective, by 
paralleling their interlocutors’ discourse contributions and conveyed perspectives. Recent 
studies on stance and structural parallelism in interaction (Kärkkäinen 2003, 2006 on the 
stance marker I think, Haddington 2007 on I guess, Du Bois 2007) have revealed that the 
meaning of stance emerges as the result of interlocutors’ joint evaluative, i.e. 
intersubjective, activity rather than being solely a matter of subsequent speakers expressing 
their subjective viewpoints. 
 In line with these recent trends in interactional stance research and drawing from a 
corpus of 700 dialogic sequences from Austrian parliamentary debates (interruptive 
comments and reactions from plenary speakers and/or MPs from the floor), I illustrate that 
opportunistically employed cross-turn parallelism may involve a particularly pervasive form 
of stance taking. I further argue that if speakers reuse structure while twisting semantic-
pragmatic meanings they evoke the addressee as part of the Ground (subjectification; 
Langacker 1987) and negotiate the intersubjective relation between speaker and addressee.  
 Accordingly, I propose to frame dialogic parallelism as intersubjective constructions (Brône 
et al., in preparation) involving intersubjectivity at the level of construal and stance.  
Following Du Bois’ (2007) stance triangle, stance resides in a complex activity whereby 
speakers evaluate objects, position subjects, and at the same time align with other subjects. 
In the case of adversarial parallelism, i.e. echoing while twisting meanings, as ubiquitous in 
parliamentary debates, I argue that speakers align at the linguistic level to express 
disalignment at the meta-communicative, interpersonal level of stance taking. Speakers 
hence express their perspective and position themselves in the socio-interactional context 
by echoing the perspectives of their interlocutors and contrasting them to their own. 
 I further examine how this socio-cognitive dimension of stance taking ties in with 
Cognitive Grammar accounts of intersubjectivity (Verhagen 2005, 2008) on the one hand, 
and models of discourse dynamics (Langacker 2001, 2008), on the other hand.  
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The amount of space shared in social interactions has been the subject of study for 
various human and social researchers (e.g. Goodwin 1981; Hall 1966; Kendon 1990; 
Levinson 2003). Speakers often reach beyond their personal gesturing space, producing 
pointing, reaching and grasping gestures which occupy a shared interpersonal space 
(Sweetser & Sizemore 2008). Drawing from cognitive linguistics, semiotics and 
linguistic anthropology, we aim to distinguish and analyze speakers’ and interlocutors’ 
use of personal and interpersonal gestural spaces in social interactions. In particular, this 
paper stresses the fact that in situations of speaker co-presence, gestures produced 
beyond the personal space not only have a discourse-regulating/content-expressive 
function, but they also have a deeper socio-communicative function which recalls 
Clark’s notion of “common ground” (1996): speakers jointly establish a space to 
metaphorically create a bridge between themselves and their interlocutors, thus 
reinforcing relations.  
 Bühler (1934) identifies three functions in human communication acts: 
representation (referencing the communicative content), expression (evidencing the 
speaker’s psychological or moral attitude), and appeal (indicating the interlocutor’s 
interest). What we dub “reaching-out gestures” during social interaction can be 
described as exhibiting a comparably strong function of appeal. Gesture research has 
been primarily concerned with the representational function of gestures (e.g. iconic and 
metaphoric, cf. McNeill 1992; Müller 1998). However, very little work has brought into 
relief the appellative function of gestures, which indeed focus the communicative 
function on the interlocutor (versus content): we suggest that predominantly appellative 
gestures tend to be more indexical and less iconic or metaphoric. This study further 
intends to identify interpersonally instantiated image schemas (Johnson 1987; cf. Cienki 
2005; Mittelberg in press) where the speaker-gesturer is the Origo (Bühler 1934) of the 
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communicative act and the starting point of image-schematic structures extending 
through space towards the addressee. 
 Gesture researchers have not yet found a uniform and sufficient way of measuring 
and describing gestural spaces (e.g. McNeill 1992; Fricke 2007), mainly due to 
inadequate, two-dimensional technologies used in recording data, but also to the 
complexities inherent to individuals’ differences in use of the space around them 
depending on gender (Little 1965), culture (Efron 1941; Watson & Graves 1966), as 
well as their personality and the communicative act in which they are engaging. To fill 
this methodological gap, this study analyzes data from a sample of speaker-gesturers 
collected by means of a motion capture system, as well as observational methods of 
gesture analysis, providing quantitative results with respect to the distance between 
speakers and their own gestures on the one hand and the space between the different 
speakers on the other.  
 After a formal analysis focusing primarily on the production of addressee-directed 
gestures, we consider functional criteria and examine their semiotic nature with respect 
to the context, distinguishing between different types of contiguity relations (cf. 
Furuyama 2000; Kita 2003; Özyurek 2000). We place these “reaching-out” gestures and 
their possible anthropological and cognitive-communicative functions of establishing a 
social bond by “giving” and “receiving” in the broader context of social interaction 
(Mauss 1924; Müller 2004). Finally, this study intends to introduce a novel combination 
of qualitative and quantitative methods of gesture analysis, thus contributing to a fuller 
understanding of the multimodal, embodied nature of social interaction during 
communication. 
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Face-to-face interaction requires speakers and their utterances to be geared to one another 
in multiple ways so as to facilitate fluent conversation. This interactive coordination 
process requires alignment between the speakers in the different modalities of interaction, 
from the linguistic level to bodily semiotics, including gesture and posture. Recent work in 
(psycho)linguistics and gesture research has started to explicitly incorporate dialogicity - 
from a multimodal perspective - in cognitive discourse models (Pickering & Garrod 2004; 
Du Bois 2007, Kimbara 2006). In embracing shared cognition, these models aim to bridge the 
traditional gap between cognitively oriented accounts of language and interactional 
approaches.  
 In order to allow for a fine-grained view on the multimodal and multifocal aspects of 
language use, discourse models need to resort to new multimodal methods. In this paper, 
we introduce one such method that tracks speakers’ perspectives and behaviour using 
head-mounted eye trackers. By recording two interlocutors’ perspectives and eye 
movements during online face-to-face interaction, we obtain a 3-D landscape of the 
conversation, including production (scene camera, sound) and processing (eye movements) 
information.  
 In two experiments, we applied the bidirectional method to inquire into the multimodal 
aspects of interactive alignment. In a first experiment, the co-participants jointly described 
animations depicting spatial scenarios running along image schematic lines. In the second 
 94 
experiment, participants were asked to jointly construe a narrative on the basis of a single 
image depicting a real-life scene. The experiments reveal a gradual process of interactive 
routine building during the description and narrative tasks, both at the level of linguistic 
choice and gestures. The eye-tracking data of the individual participants offer a window on 
which behavioural features are processed and picked up in the alignment process on the 
one hand, and which eye-movement patterns emerge when producing a co-ordinated 
utterance.  
 Since conversation can be regarded as a joint action (Clark, 1996) rather than a linear 
series of utterances, it would only seem obvious to maximally embrace the interlocutors’ 
perspectives in an empirical study of conversation. The two conducted experiments serve 
to illustrate that the bidirectional approach yields a fine-grained view of the interactive co-
ordination of different modalities in face-to-face interaction.  
 
